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ABSTRACT
It has been said that the space environment is becoming so accessible, we are at risk of
depleting it as a resource, thereby risking society’s space-dependent functions. Law, regulations,
policies, and guidelines exist to guide entities to act to preserve the space environment.
However, best space traffic management (STM) practice implementation and regulatory
compliance could be costly and resource-intensive, especially for a small business. Some
entities may not undertake innovative space endeavors at all, or worse, ignore laws, regulations,
policies, and guidelines.
A question arises of how space actors could be persuaded to work toward meeting STM
laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines and perhaps take on potentially costly practices to
follow them. This thesis attempts to answer whether liability apportionment and risk-pooling
through a space protection and indemnity (P&I) club membership could benefit a space actor
enough to drive implementation of best space traffic management practices where actors could
be more likely to adhere to laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines.
The study is limited to one example model space P&I club in the U.S. as a foundation for
a potential larger international group in the future. The study assumes both insurance and P&I
calls can be based on publicly available financial information, though need for more detailed
information on insurance premiums and P&I calls is needed to create a fine-tuned model. The
study also assumes a potential space P&I club member would be subject to U.S. law, regulations,
and policy. Methods include document and policy analysis, interviews with space insurance and
risk management subject matter experts, and cost analyses. Arguably, a case does indeed exist
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wherein a potential space P&I club membership could benefit a space actor enough to encourage
implementation of best space traffic management practices. However, it would be best used as
part of the bigger STM picture alongside existing regulations and policies. Still, a P&I club
membership could provide a significant enough benefit where actors could be more likely to
adhere to regulations and policies, which would, in turn, have a positive impact on keeping the
space environment sustainable for current and future activities.
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Introduction and Background
It has been stated many times throughout the conversation surrounding space traffic
management (STM) that outer space is “becoming increasingly congested and contested,”1 and
“our global space environment is on a path of suffering a Tragedy of the Commons.”2 The
tragedy of the commons “refers to a situation in which individuals with access to a shared
resource (also called a common) act in their own interest and, in doing so, ultimately deplete the
resource.3 The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty, or
OST) provides “outer space… shall be free for exploration and use by all States without
discrimination of any kind….”4 In other words, particularly when addressing matters of outer
space and especially as launch and spacecraft technological capability becomes more and more
accessible even to small entities (such as new space startups) and students, space activity could
be perceived as leading us into a tragedy of the commons situation in the outer space
environment.
In June 2018, President Donald Trump signed Space Policy Directive 3 (SPD3), a space
traffic management (STM) policy setting forth principles, goals, and guidelines to help ensure

1

The White House. Space Policy Directive-3, National Space Traffic Management Policy [hereinafter
SPD3]. Washington, D.C.: The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, 2018: 3. Accessed August
15, 2019. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/space-policy-directive-3-national-space-trafficmanagement-policy/.
2
Reopening the American Frontier: Promoting Partnerships Between Commercial Space and the U.S.
Government to Advance Exploration and Settlement: Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on Space, Science, and
Competitiveness, 115 Cong. (2017) (stat ement of Moriba Jah, Associate Professor, Aerospace Engineering and
Engineering Mechanics, Cockell School of Engineering, The University of Texas at Austin) [hereinafter Statement],
5, accessed March 31, 2018. https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/c2f571ea-f105-411a-8f86da2e2745cc68/270AD245868C44DB055E3BA358E752C8.dr.-moriba-jah-testimony-1-.pdf
3
Alexandra Spiliakos, “Tragedy of the Commons: What it is and 5 Examples,” February 6, 2019,
https://online.hbs.edu/blog/post/tragedy-of-the-commons-impact-on-sustainability-issues.
4
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies [hereinafter OST] art. I, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S.
205.
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the use of outer space can continue in a safe and sustainable way. SPD3 defines STM as “the
planning, coordination, and on-orbit synchronization of activities to enhance the safety, stability,
and sustainability of operations in the space environment.”5 The International Academy of
Astronautics (IAA) defines space traffic management as “the set of technical and regulatory
provisions for promoting safe access into outer space, operations in outer space and return from
outer space to Earth free from physical or radio-frequency interference.”6 “Safe” space access
and operations encompass several key areas, including but not limited to mitigation of orbital
debris and best practices to prevent it, advancement of space situational awareness (SSA) and
greater sharing of pertinent data, and monitoring and tracking of space objects and prevention of
conjunctions and collisions. SPD3 defines SSA as “the knowledge and characterization of space
objects and their operational environment to support safe, stable, and sustainable space
activities.”7
While international and U.S. domestic entities and governing bodies have drafted policies
and best practices to help manage space traffic, there are still many holes to be filled as to the
actual logistics of how STM can (and should) be carried out. Some facets of STM to consider
include identification, tracking, and monitoring; collision avoidance; and long-term sustainability
of our space environment by keeping our “orbital highways” clean. But the question arises
regarding specifics of how we implement strategies and tactics to manage our spacecraft’s paths
on orbit.

5

SPD3, 3.
International Academy of Astronautics, Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management, 2006,
https://iaaweb.org/iaa/Studies/spacetraffic.pdf.
7
SPD3, 3.
6
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And what about the risk involved? Harrington describes risk as “fundamentally an
external danger.”8 Merriam-Webster defines risk as
1: possibility of loss or injury; 2: someone or something that creates
or suggests a hazard; 3a : the chance of loss or the perils to the
subject matter of an insurance contract, also: the degree of
probability of such loss; b: a person or thing that is a specified hazard
to an insurer; c: an insurance hazard from a specified cause or
source… .”9
According to Julie Wertz, a team “must figure out how to best apply [its] limited resources to
maximize [its] chance of success” in getting a mission design “to work in the way it is planned to
achieve the mission objectives.” 10 Therefore, teams have “formalized the idea of risk,” which in
its essence is as follows: “Risk, R, is defined as the product of the probability of a negative event
occurring, P, and the impact, or consequence, of that event, I.”11 Once risks are identified
(which could be accomplished using lessons learned or through the expertise of individuals who
designed/are designing the system), Wertz states they should be documented and should include
a “risk statement,” or a statement in the form of “’if event, then consequence.’” 12 These risk
identifications and statements can then be captured qualitatively, for example in a “fever chart,”
or a matrix that frames a scale for probability and impact of the identified potential risk.13 The
matrix could contain any number of rows and columns, and “typical sizes include 3 x 3, 4 x 4, or
5 x 5.”14 The description in each cell can be qualitative, such as “’High, Medium, Low” or ‘Very

8

Andrea Harrington, Space Insurance and the Law: Maximizing Private Activities in Outer Space
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2021), 15.
9
Merriam-Webster Definition of Risk https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/risk accessed
3/12/2022
10
Julie Wertz, Space Mission Engineering: The New SMAD, eds. James R. Wertz, David F. Everett, and
Jeffery J. Puschell (Hawthorne: Microcosm Press, 2011), 767.
11
Wertz, 767.
12
Wertz, 770.
13
Wertz, 770.
14
Wertz, 771.
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Likely, Somewhat Likely, Not Likely, Very Unlikely.’” 15 As an example, one type of hazard to
an insurer that is typically called out as exclusions in insurance policies is a war risk. It could be
argued that a war risk may be very unlikely, but would have a very high negative impact to a
spacecraft/mission (and would send ripple effects to everyday life on Earth). In terms of liability
and insurance, an act of war will be examined pertaining to exclusions from space insurance
coverage and supplemental P&I club coverage.
As a more in-depth introduction, in the current state of our outer space environment,
different types of spacecraft reside in different orbits depending on their purposes. The
International Space Station (ISS), Hubble Space Telescope (HST), some Earth
observation/remote sensing satellites, spy satellites, and communication satellite constellations,
exist in low Earth orbit (LEO). Navigation satellites and the Iridium satellite constellation reside
in medium Earth orbit (MEO). Other Earth observation satellites are in polar orbit.16 Most
commercial communications satellites are in Geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) at 36,000 km
altitude, and many of these satellites reside in orbital slots over the Equator.
The United States Department of Defense (DOD) arguably has the most comprehensive
database containing spacecraft status and activity. The database was once overseen by
USSTRATCOM and Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) (subsequently, Combined Space
Operations Center [CSpOC]) and has now been transferred to the responsibility of U.S. Space
Command, specifically the 18th Space Control Squadron (18 SPCS) at Vandenburg Air Force

15

Wertz, 771.
Alex Ellery, Joerg Kreisel, and Bernd Sommer. “The case for robotic on-orbit servicing of spacecraft:
Spacecraft reliability is a myth.” Acta Astronautica 63 (2008): 632.
.

16
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Base in California.17 Per Sandra Erwin in SpaceNews, 18 SPCS has made “improvements in
space debris tracking” and has optimized processes to provide “’more meaningful’ data on
approximately 25,000 space objects tracked by the U.S. military,”18 and while this is the case,
tracking and monitoring space traffic is consuming a significant part of DOD resources. An
examination of whether a commercial entity could bear some of the burden may be advisable,
but the tracking and monitoring tasks are still costly and resource-intensive, which may cause
industry actors to balk.
One of the goals of SPD3 is to “enable [science and technology] research and
development to support the practical applications of [space situational awareness] and STM.”19
As stated above, tracking and monitoring activity in and of itself is costly and consumes
significant resources; adding the weight of research and development (R&D) to the mix would
likely greatly increase the required funds and resources needed to successfully accomplish an
ongoing tracking and monitoring system.
How can some of the burden be shared to encourage private/commercial spacecraft
owner/operators to implement these strategies and tactics? According to a position paper drafted
by the National Space Society (NSS), advanced technological capability such as active debris
removal (ADR) that could fulfill SPD3’s (and other policies’ and guidelines’ recommendations)
may not be within reach of certain actors, possibly including developing countries or small
businesses. As a result, the NSS recommends “a way to enable market forces to help service the

17
Sandra Erwin, “U.S. Space Command announces improvements in space debris tracking,” SpaceNews,
September 24, 2020, https://spacenews.com/u-s-space-command-announces-improvements-in-space-debristracking/.
18
Erwin, 2020.
19
SPD3, 4.
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debris problem,” and “propose[s] funding for liability compensation through mechanisms such as
protection and indemnity (P&I) space clubs in collaboration with other stakeholders.”20
The NSS position paper specifically addresses a possible space P&I club only with regard
to ADR and space salvage, using maritime salvage as its analogue. Due to the vast nature of the
appeal of incentivization and relief of some financial and other burden for implementing other
STM best practices overall, combined with recent space sustainability initiatives, US regulation,
and traditional insurance policies, the NSS’ proposed approach for forming a space P&I club
could apply to a much broader spectrum of STM activities and solutions. The space P&I club
could “carry out liability apportionment and compensation agreements with national
governments, underwriters, investors, etc.,”21 so members would receive some benefit from
implementing best practices, as well as some relief from bearing the full burden of potentially
costly and risky STM activity. If this approach combining industry and standardization of best
practices is put in place, it could make the current/existing fragmented STM guidelines more
standard and coherent, thus making a significant impact on how quickly we can get to work on
the operational matters of managing space traffic. If a space P&I club membership could
potentially provide enough benefit, financial or otherwise, a space actor could be incentivized to
implement best STM practices by incorporating STM technology or compliance measures, such
as end-of-life (EOL) disposal, etc., using that benefit to motivate the action.
A key aspect in managing space traffic is orbital debris. STM and orbital debris are not
interchangeable terms, though they are very much tied together. Orbital debris is defined by the
Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) as “all man made objects including

20
“Space Debris Removal, Salvage, and Use: Maritime Lessons” [hereinafter, “NSS”], National Space
Society, 5, accessed July 26, 2020, https://space.nss.org/wp-content/uploads/NSS-Position-Paper-Space-DebrisRemoval-2019.pdf.
21
NSS, 5.
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fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit or re-entering the atmosphere, that are non
functional.”22 SPD3 defines orbital debris as “any human-made space object orbiting Earth that
no longer serves any useful purpose.”23 Much of the focus of the regulations, policies, and
guidelines discussed in this paper aims to address mitigation (possibly even removal) of orbital
debris and facilitating capabilities and technologies to do so.
While SPD3 lays a strong framework, as of December 2020, the world had (arguably) not
yet seen the start of paving a solid path toward a solution for managing space traffic –
domestically or globally. In the United States, alongside SPD3, the Orbital Debris Mitigation
Standard Practices (ODMSP) (last updated in 2019) provides exactly that: best practices for
STM overall, but, as its name makes clear, mainly addressing orbital debris. SPD3 and ODMSP
are intended to work in concert to manage space traffic, mitigate risk of spacecraft conjunctions
or collisions, and plant the seed for future active debris remediation (ADR).
As stated above, while these guidelines and best practices essentially have the same
goals, solid STM efforts have not gained much momentum. Finding solutions that will meet
each goal is difficult and complex. For example, a State or private organization with greater
financial ability and resources to address STM issues, even if the entity was not acting dubiously,
might be seen as placing its own interests ahead of focusing on solving the problem for the
greater good. With regard to governance, it may be preferable that one entity is responsible for
providing standard policies, guidelines, and best practices in the multiple facets of STM to
prevent fragmented and arguably, in some cases, ineffective and out-of-date guidelines from
governments, agencies, and organizations.

22

IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines [hereinafter “SDMG”], Inter-Agency Space Debris
Coordination Committee, IADC-02-01 Revision 2, March, 2020.
23
SPD3, 3.
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Purpose/Objectives
STM is a broad, multi-faceted, much-discussed, and much-debated issue, and while
policies, guidelines, and best practices are periodically updated and released, society so far has
only taken incremental steps to put the “rules of the orbital road” in place. This study aims to
propose one potential avenue to provide additional relief in some of the burden and complexity
of implementation of best STM practices, which is potentially very costly, by facilitating sharing
of the burden of liability and risk by space activity stakeholders. This sharing of liability and
risk could be accomplished through membership in a space P&I club. It should be noted that
P&I club membership is supplemental to traditional insurance where P&I clubs may “pick up”
coverage for what would typically be excluded from conventional policies.
Statement of the Problem
Due to the risky and costly nature of STM implementation, as described above, industry
actors may balk at adhering to policy, guidelines, and best practices, and they may push back –
or they may opt to not adhere at all. This do-nothing approach only propagates the problem of
fragmented management of the growing volume of space traffic. How, then, might industry
actors, or at least a subset thereof, be encouraged to act toward meeting STM policy and
guidelines such as SPD3 and FCC satellite licensing regulations? The question this paper
attempts to answer is whether liability apportionment and risk-pooling through a potential space
protection and indemnity (P&I) club membership would benefit U.S. spacecraft owner operators
enough for them to implement best STM practices set forth in existing regulations, policies, and
guidelines, namely SPD3 and FCC satellite licensing regulations. The study will examine an
existing maritime P&I club and how it might be used as an analog for a space P&I club, and

9
whether a space P&I club membership would benefit a U.S.-based spacecraft owner/operator to
account for recommended best STM practices in its space activity. Further, the nature of liability
apportionment and risk-pooling as part of a potential space P&I club membership and whether
liability apportionment and risk-pooling within that P&I club membership provide benefit to
spacecraft owner/operators is examined. From there, the question of whether the potential
benefit of a space P&I club membership is greater than the cost of being part of the club is
analyzed and discussed, thus attempting to determine if potential space P&I club membership is
favorable to spacecraft owner/operators with regard to these assets.
Additionally, the study attempts to answer whether adherence to existing laws,
regulations, policies, and guidelines is a benefit stemming from P&I club membership and, if so,
whether the benefit of adhering to them is greater than the cost. In other words, would potential
space P&I club membership drive better behaviors in space activity that could gradually lead to
helping manage space traffic in a cleaner manner and helping mitigate and/or remediate orbital
debris?
Scope
The topics of STM and space insurance are vast and affect global society. However, this
study is limited to a maritime P&I club in the U.S., of which there is only one: American
Steamship Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association, Inc, otherwise known as The
American Club.24 The spacecraft owner/operators in this study are limited to those that have
publicly available financial information within annual reports, statements, and on their websites.
This study specifically focuses on entities that have active satellite constellations that reside on
LEO because orbits within LEO are of most present concern due to its accessibility, increasingly

24

The American Club, accessed March 13, 2022, https://www.american-club.com.
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crowded nature, and the number of accidents that have occurred and potentially will occur in the
future.25 Additionally, technology demonstrations have already been performed in attempts to
service, deorbit, repair, and/or refuel LEO satellites that would help clean up at least one of our
orbits and ideally facilitate safer and more efficient STM practices.
Additionally, the scope of the study addresses existing international treaties and
conventions as the space environment is inherently open to all States; U.S. Space Policy,
legislation, regulatory and regulatory licensing requirements; and other existing guidelines and
best practices the U.S. (including NASA) has/have adopted. Stakeholders within the scope of
the study would include theoretical space P&I club members (namely spacecraft
owner/operators), the United States Government (USG), a traditional space insurer, and third
parties to whom damage will have occurred on orbit as well as on the Earth’s surface. On a
wider scale, the overall “collective stakeholder” is society as a whole, as we have become very
dependent on many space-based resources.
Assumptions
Some assumptions are required within this study since some information, such as space
insurance policy premium rates and P&I club call rates, are proprietary in nature, and not all
company financial data are publicly available. Additionally, assumptions for models discussed
in this research are necessary to keep the study within scope. This study assumes that:
a) The spacecraft owner/operator is based in the United States
b) The spacecraft owner/operator currently carries traditional insurance policy/coverage
typical for that particular spacecraft

25

Michael S. Dodge, “The Divergent and Evolving Legal Pathways of Future Space Traffic Management
Collaboration,” Space Traffic Management Conference 14 (2015): 1.
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c) The cost of a space P&I club membership is proportional based on tonnage of spacecraft,
similar to a maritime P&I club
d) There were zero accidents in the prior year for the model space P&I club, thus resulting
in a “flat” starting balance
e) An occurrence giving rise to a claim would be excluded from a traditional spacecraft
insurance policy and would trigger P&I “insurance” coverage
f) The occurrence involved material that was non-biological in nature
g) The cost of the above-referenced occurrence would not fall under the responsible party’s
contractual limitation of liability provision
h) Until the time of occurrence, the spacecraft involved had been operating for a full year
and had been generating a full year’s revenue
Method
The methods used to investigate this question were qualitative. They were chosen due to
the fact that the researcher was able to collect qualitative data, including a general cost analysis
(discussed below) and concurrently, integrate the data, and then compare the data to “confirm or
disconfirm the… results”, which is beneficial in answering the particular questions posed here.26
The qualitative research portions consisted of: 1) examination of documents, 2) examination of
audiovisual and digital materials, 3) a case study of a U.S.-based maritime P&I club to be used as
an analog for a space P&I club, and 4) interviews with two subject matter experts on space
insurance and space activity/satellite mission risk management. Further, the research consisted
of collection and analysis of financial data from: 1) commercial satellite owner/operators with

26

John W. Creswell and J. David Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed
Methods Approaches (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2018), 220.
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publicly available financial information, 2) membership dues for a maritime P&I club, 3)
financial information regarding the satellite industry, 4) financial information from loss of
satellite and insurance claims. The exact financial data for each commercial entity are not fully
known because much of it is proprietary information, but an estimate was made based on
information that is publicly available.
The research began with selecting the relevant types of material to be reviewed, starting
with examination of documents. The first types of documents examined were public documents
in the forms of international treaties, policies, and guidelines pertinent to and addressing STM;
and US legislation, regulation, policies, guidelines, and agency reports addressing same.
Information from government documents pertaining to STM guidelines and best practices was
gathered and specific recommended guidelines and best practices that appear throughout material
as trends were selected for study.
The second types of documents examined were documents available to the public in the
forms of up-to-date news stories and magazine articles regarding the current status and activity
surrounding STM. It could be stated that a third type of examined documents include the
material in the literature review within this study, which encompasses other researchers’ studies
and an overarching conversation about STM, orbital debris, on-orbit satellite servicing (OOS),
and P&I clubs tied together by cost, risk, and liability of implementation of STM best practices.
The next step was to determine which audiovisual and digital materials would be
examined. It was discovered that in addition to government documents setting forth guidelines
and best practices and news articles discussing these guidelines and best practices, live
discussion was occurring in U.S. House of Representatives and Senate committee and
subcommittee hearings and in radio shows and podcasts. U.S Congressional hearings were
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selected based on the specific space-related committee/subcommittee conducting the hearing and
the topic(s) of discussion, and whether STM was a talking point anywhere within that discussion.
Podcast and radio show episodes were first selected based on their reliability as sources via
researcher as key instrument.27 The researcher personally knows one podcast host and two
subject matter experts (SMEs) in the area of STM and has validated their background. The two
SMEs have been guests on a podcast hosted by an individual familiar to the researcher and on a
separate radio show. Each podcast and radio show episode was entirely focused on STM or an
element thereof, and each consisted of in-depth value-added interviews with the guest SME.
Audiovisual and digital materials pertaining to STM from Congressional hearings and guest
SMEs on podcasts or radio shows based on live conversation and debate were gathered. The fact
that the SMEs are personally known to the author is acknowledged. To help prevent any
potential bias in studying material involving the SMEs, a wide spectrum of opinions from other
sources/industry experts was reviewed to gather a broad range of information from sources of
varying experience and backgrounds.
Direct interviews were conducted with SMEs in the areas of space insurance and
commercial space mission risk management. Interview subjects were chosen based on
experience in actual operations and/or risk cases handled, and University of North Dakota
Institutional Review Board approval was obtained to conduct the interviews. Chris Kunstadter,
Global Head of Space at AXA XL insurance was selected based on his extensive experience
working in the insurance industry, specifically with space insurance policies. Second, Charles
Thornton, Director, Aerospace Risk Management at Northrop Grumman was chosen based on
his extensive experience working for a large company in the aerospace industry that has

27

Creswell and Creswell, 181.
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successfully developed, demonstrated, and provides OOS, thus he would be able to speak to
some of the development of such a mission and some of the specific risks involved.
Research material selection also consisted of determining which relevant peer-reviewed
journal articles pertaining to any of the elements of this study would be examined, including but
not limited to: STM; accompanying risk, cost, or liability; OOS; and/or STM-related legislation
and policy. These journal articles make up the literature review herein and recur as points of
discussion throughout this paper.
Then the commercial entities to be used in the study were selected. The entities:
Northrop Grumman, OneWeb, SpaceX, Swarm Technologies, AXA XL, The American Club,
and The Shipowners’ Club, were also part of cost analyses in that their financial data were used
as analogs for what economic effect a space P&I club membership might have on a commercial
satellite owner/operator, but their selection as the analogs was based on certain specific criteria.
OneWeb was selected because 1) its financial data regarding assets, losses, and revenue are
available through its annual report, and 2) its spacecraft constellation resides in LEO. SpaceX
was chosen for a similar reason: its pricing information for its launch vehicle is available on its
website and was incorporated into the potential cost for a theoretical space mission.
Swarm Technologies was chosen because it was a small business and provided a service
using a constellation of very small CubeSats which is part of the focus of whom a P&I club
membership may benefit. It was also chosen due to its activity under which it was scrutinized
and ultimately fined by the FCC for serious regulatory violations, which is studied in light of
existing US regulatory and policy regime. Northrop Grumman was chosen because it has
developed and demonstrated OOS missions that can be used as examples of innovative
technology recommended in the US Space Policy and other guidelines to help mitigate orbital
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debris and thus, arguably, facilitate a safer and more efficient STM system. AXA XL was
chosen because one of the subject matter experts with whom the researcher spoke is its Global
Head of Space, and he was able to directly provide certain (non-proprietary and nonconfidential) information regarding space insurance policies, coverage, and exclusions. The
American Club was selected because it is a US-based maritime P&I club and it includes detailed
information on its operations, bylaws, and financial information on its website. It was chosen
specifically to be used as an analogue for a potential US-based space P&I Club. The
Shipowners’ Club was chosen strictly because information pertaining to the spectrum of its
membership is publicly available on its website.
Additionally, this specific selection of commercial entities is included because their
history, overview, and profile of each entity were available and were examined to gather
information about their activities and everyday business. A due diligence qualitative assessment
of the commercial entities was important to the study because they each needed to meet
requirements to ensure they were good candidates to be used as models. Each entity’s
documents, statements, and reports were examined, including types of services offered, how each
entity functions, who their respective targeted markets are, and each entity’s overall goals and
visions. The entity documents created a narrative that allowed a bigger picture to be envisioned
and the foundation of space-specific models based on existing companies to be laid.
Financial data from OneWeb, Swarm Technologies, EnduroSat, and maritime P&I clubs
(namely, The American Club and The Shipowners’ Club) were gathered, specifically revenue
brought in from services provided by satellite companies and P&I clubs in the form of
subscriptions and memberships. Secondly, these entities’ expenses and losses were examined to
approximate amount of capital expenditures on typical commercial communications satellites
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and losses due to claims, respectively. This information was taken from each entity’s publicly
available cost and pricing information, annual/financial statements, and websites. Once this
information was obtained, costs of satellites for each spacecraft company were approximated
based on number of satellites (according to stated asset, number of satellites launched, and
purchase data). (The importance of the cost of a satellite comes into play in determining how
potential accidents would affect various businesses, insurance policy costs, and P&I club
membership calls.) P&I club membership dues were approximated by the number of members,
amount of tonnage, and revenue brought in during the course of one fiscal year, according to the
clubs’ annual statements. Losses due to claims were also examined, the figures taken from the
same annual statements.
Financial information regarding servicing missions that are currently being developed
was gathered through annual statements, news reports and press releases. Contracts between
commercial entities, namely Orbital ATK (now Northrop Grumman) and Intelsat, were not able
to be quantitatively parsed out, so the contracts between NASA and SSL for Restore-L and
DARPA and SSL for RSGS were examined to gather approximate costs for pieces of the
spacecraft. It was determined that four major components make up an OOS satellite: the
spacecraft bus, a number of mission tools (toolkit), robotic arms, and launch vehicles.28 The
approximate cost of the spacecraft bus was acquired from the contract awarded to SSL from
NASA for the Restore-L mission, and the cost of the robotic arm was acquired from the contract
awarded to SSL from DARPA. The launch vehicle cost was acquired from SpaceX’s website.
The cost of the toolkit is not readily available, so this figure was approximated by using the cost
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of the spacecraft bus as a minimum (it is assumed that the toolkit will cost at least as much as the
spacecraft bus).
Further, information on dollar value of an industrial working maritime craft – in this case,
a 95-foot tug boat, was gathered, as well as information on its gross tonnage and approximate
mass based on its displacement. These figures were worked with averages and approximations
of publicly available financial data and an estimated range of possible annual insurance
premiums were estimated. The annual premium estimates were used to determine potential
spacecraft insurance policy rates based on the cost analyses of a potential OOS mission, pricing
information on websites, and information taken from financial statements. The same process
was used to approximate what a potential space P&I club call would be for a spacecraft
owner/operator.
The above information was compiled and explored the following areas: problem areas of
STM; importance of the space environment in daily life; STM-related law/policy, regulations,
guidelines; space business operational and financial information; STM technical capability and
implementation; space insurance and risk management subject matter expertise; space insurance
policy coverage; and potential space supplemental P&I club coverage based on a maritime P&I
club as an analogue. Based on a broad, yet detailed, spectrum of information, supporting
exposition was created as to each area’s importance and relevance within STM, policy, risk
management, business, and how P&I club membership could help support a space company in
each of these areas. Subsequently, it was determined whether supplemental coverage in a
potential space P&I club would incentivize a space actor to implement best STM practices.
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Literature Review
The sources reviewed in this study address the following: reasons behind the need for
implementing STM; a discussion of pertinent STM legislation, policies, guidelines,
recommendations, and best practices; current STM activity and status; some of the technical
methods proposed and tested to support STM; and the potential benefits and shortcomings of
maritime P&I clubs. Subsequently, the overarching discussion was analyzed and included in the
Analysis and Discussion of this study.
The literature indicates trends of discussion about several subtopics within various areas
of STM. Ongoing updates and discussion about STM activity is important because it is a fluid,
ever-changing subject, and experts continue to come up with solutions based on the best
information we have at present. STM-related law and policy discussion is relevant and
important because it explores how owner/operators might support policies and guidelines by
building specific engineering/hardware into their spacecraft. Costly technical STM-related
components and implementations on spacecraft in combination with potentially very risky onorbit maneuvers is a step for introducing the potential for P&I clubs’ mechanism to alleviate
some of the risk taken on by spacecraft owner/operators.
Jakhu, et al. explain, “[s]pace debris seriously threatens the sustainability of space
utilization since it is considered to be an emerging navigation hazard to functional or operating
satellites.”29 Some studies have shown LEO is rapidly approaching the “tipping point” at which
our space-based capabilities may begin to decrease and the Kessler Syndrome might become
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reality,30 and some believe we have already reached it.31 As Hunter notes, space capabilities
“play a role in everything from buying gas to national defense.” 32 If the number of objects in
orbit around the Earth becomes too great, we risk losing those capabilities to damage from
collisions, or we may potentially not be able to launch satellites in the future to continue services
because there is too much risk of damage from collisions with other craft – space would have
simply become too crowded. Hunter notes further that “[d]isruption in access to space-reliant
services potentially range from minor inconveniences to catastrophic global economic
collapse.”33
Hunter states since the Iridium-Cosmos collision, conjunction notifications, or alerts that
certain spacecraft may “cross paths” and potentially strike one another, have increased
dramatically.34 In 2011, JSpOC (now SCPS 18) “made 4,331 notifications to satellite
owners/operators regarding potential conjunctions,”35 and Jakhu, et al. note the number of
collision avoidance maneuvers has also increased.36 Recently, Jah explained in a BBC podcast
that one collision occurs every couple years on average, but we have recent evidence that
collisions are happening more frequently.37 More frequent collisions will lead to the formation
of more debris.
Jah believes the biggest problem preventing us from having a “more robust space traffic
monitoring and management capability” is the fact that we do not globally share observational
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RSO data as a community.38 There are some reasons we are not able to share information with
other States, such as national security, intellectual property, or regulations such as ITAR, but
SSA experts say “the more eyes watching objects in space, the more accurately governments and
commercial operators can predict orbits for their spacecraft, and in turn, the better they can
predict the likelihood of a collision.”39
Jah and Hunter both address the fact that USSTRATCOM/JSpOC (now 18 SCPS) was
already overburdened by maintaining its database of “resident space objects” (RSOs). Hunter
explains when Space Fence became operational, the number of catalogued items would increase
“from the tens-of-thousands to the hundreds-of-thousands range and current processing systems
and manpower would be quickly overcome by the magnitude of data available to be analyzed.”40
To address the myriad of issues with regard to STM, there have been a great number of
proposed solutions. Michael S. Dodge states
[o]n the one hand, this produces a dilemma, in that there are STM efforts
underway by various States that are externally inconsistent with one another, even
though they share the goal of safe management of space assets. On the other,
systems in place by space actors can serve as ready-made exemplars of
methodologies that could, if properly modified, inform the creation of eventual
international STM norms.41
One possible solution is for an international organization to be created via a “new treaty
negotiated specifically for the purpose of ADR and OOS,” drawing comparisons to the formation
of the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) and the
International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT).42 Jakhu, et al. state this new
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international organization could negotiate with States on whose registry a piece of orbital debris
is listed regarding potential ADR or OOS. 43 The international organization could have the right
of jurisdiction and control transferred to them, and be authorized to perform ADR or OOS
services. 44 If the object being serviced is damaged during the process, the international
organization would have cross-waivers of liability in place that allow it to settle. 45 Additionally,
any concerns regarding intellectual property, State-specific regulations in place intended to
protect national security (such as ITAR), or the potential weaponization of spacecraft through
ADR or OOS would be transparently explained through diplomatic channels before the activity
takes place, thus, Jakhu, et al. theorize, alleviating fears that the ADR or OOS activity would be
performed in bad faith.46
However, it has been stated that there is little interest in forming new space treaties in the
current political climate, and, according to professor emerita at the University of Mississippi
School of Law, Joanne Gabrynowicz, “‘[national] legislation and regulation is the only plausible
avenue for modernizing the legal framework in outer space right now.’”47 Because addressing
the orbital debris is a matter of urgency, domestic solutions may help in the short-term while
concurrent development on a long-term international solution occurs.48 Further, the theory of a
“clearinghouse of information collected by government and corporate interests… and sharing
critical information… could also be extended to an international non-governmental
organization.”49
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Jah suggests a civilian STM organization would best provide these services (including
tracking of RSOs as well as execution of ADR, discussed further below); Hunter recommends a
similar single point-of-contact “store-front” approach, but it appears logical that the best solution
for tracking and monitoring would be if States were to pool resources and create a ubiquitous
catalog of known objects. One possible approach to an STM solution, as Percy and Landrum
theorizes, is to “allow an international standards organization, such as ISO, to enact Industry
Standards against the creation of space debris.”50 It is in the aerospace industry’s best interest to
maintain a “clean environment” in space, so a company that does not comply with the set
standards would fail to remain competitive. 51 Dodge notes that similarly, trade organizations,
such as the International Air Transport Association, have had positive impact on the behavior of
airlines, so it is logical to believe a trade organization dealing with “collision avoidance, traffic
guidance, and other on-orbit activities... could arise to obviate present STM difficulties.” 52
How would an entity be held to complying with established policy, guidelines, and
standards? Percy and Landrum theorize domestic space debris policy could “require spacecraft
manufacturers and operators to comply with industry standards,”53 but domestic policy is not
binding law.
Harrington states “the international nature of major space insurers and near-universal
need for their products uniquely positions this group to act as a form of quasi-governance that
can contractually enforce (or at least incentivize) best practices that effectively function as
regulation for the industry.”54 Echoing the sentiment in ESA’s commentary regarding the space
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sustainability rating and the potential for incentivizing actors to implement best STM practices
by insurance discounts and other “perks” for a high rating, Harrington states “[b]est practices can
be implemented first as ways to obtain premium discounts and subsequently as requirements,
spreading across the industry as insurers struggle to remain competitive with their peers and
cooperative with their clients.”55 Chris Kunstadter believes in a different approach – one that
would add a surcharge to a space company’s insurance policy if it does not implement best STM
practices.56
Kunstadter states, “[r]isk transfer is one of the ways in which enterprises manage risk,
along with avoidance, reduction, and retention,” and “[i]nsurers take those risks… But a
significant insurance loss due to a collision in orbit will have an immediate, dramatic, and
chilling effect on the space insurance market, and thus on the whole space industry.” 57 Further,
“ambiguous legal regimes threaten the viability of a robust commercial human spaceflight
market.”58 He further explains, “[s]pace insurance policies are typically ‘all-risks'— they
provide coverage for all losses except those that are specifically excluded,” i.e. war, terrorism,
and cybersecurity-related incidents. 59 Thus, “collisions with debris and micrometeoroids are
generally covered,” and despite the fact that “some insurance companies have curtailed their
exposures or even withdrawn from insuring satellites in LEO,” others are “increasingly including
the risk of collision in orbit in their underwriting assessments.”60 So, Kunstadter echoes
Harrington and explains “[a]s demand for insurance in LEO increases with increasing
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commercial use, a lack of insurance coverage would have a stifling effect on the space
economy.”61
According to Alyssa Goessler, “[a]nalogies are often made between the policy spheres of
maritime law and space law, given that both pertain to a physical space with no clear regulatory
jurisdiction, or perhaps overlapping regulatory jurisdictions,” proposing “the high seas… most
resemble near-earth space.” 62 She makes the further analogy by describing a canal as a “humanmade waterway channel that boats can pass through,” and though “[t]here are no human-made
passageways in space… there are “orbital highways”–bands of orbit that several… space objects
pass through.” 63 Using the case of the Ever Given ship that became stuck in the Suez Canal in
2021, Goessler states “[w]e must observe the environment and align our practices with
ecological conditions at hand… [j]ust as the salvage crews and Suez Port Authority aligned their
work with the environmental conditions at hand.” Further, “[w]e must boost efforts to measure
and quantify the space environment in order to craft sustainable traffic management
mechanisms.” 64 Reiterating Jah’s point that the comprehensive gathering of good data regarding
the space environment and tracking its objects, Goessler states we could use that space
environment data to “aid in orbital salvage practices,” and this author will emphasize the fact that
this data can be used far beyond orbital salvage practices and are, in fact, crucial to all space
activity.65
Goessler further acknowledges that “[n]o cross-domain analogy will be perfect, but
identifying conceptual similarities may better equip us to handle novel circumstances in space,”
61
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but examining and analyzing these similarities between the maritime and space environments
“will enable us to judiciously prepare for and avoid collisions on orbit,” a similar theory
proposed in the NSS position paper discussed below.66
Dr. Jah has stated he “think[s] people are hoping that government basically comes to
some common sense to help create and establish a marketplace for industries to engage in”
activities that facilitate space sustainability.67 To that end, “he believes that spacefaring nations
have to agree that near-Earth space is an ecosystem like land, air and the ocean” – it falls under
the tragedy of the commons and will need to be protected.68 Then, Jah continues, one could
potentially
assign a bounty for objects and talk about nonconsensual debris
removal… Maybe there is a penalty to the sovereign owner of their
dead asset that’s taking up capacity of an orbit. This could definitely
create a marketplace where space-object-removal technologies can
thrive.69
In concert with the NSS position paper, the foundation for the comparison between the
space and maritime environments can begin to be laid.
As echoed by Goessler, the NSS recognizes calls for actions to keep our space
environment sustainable and “proposes mechanisms… to overcome barriers to creating a safe
space environment via active debris remediation and salvage, including ways to overcome
daunting liability and compensation impediments.”70 The NSS realizes ADR and space salvage
activity “is very difficult under the current international legal space regime and orbital
conditions,” and further theorizes these regimes and “orbital conditions” disincentivize actors
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from engaging in ADR and space salvage endeavors. The OST and Liability Conventions,
particularly, complicate liability assessment, as again, determination of ownership of a spacecraft
is extremely difficult, especially when the spacecraft are “unclaimed and neither the spacecraft
owner nor operator nor the launching State can be determined.”71
Even if a State’s liability for its spacecraft could be determined (as a reminder, the burden
of proof for determination of whose craft inflicted the damage is on the harmed party) via a
multilateral liability apportionment agreement through invoking Art. V of the Liability
Convention, “there would remain the issue of funding the compensation for any party harmed.”72
To explore a solution to this problem, the NSS asks whether any lessons can be “gleaned [from]
liability and compensation regimes for salvage or the removal of pollution and debris in the
maritime context.”73
Essentially, “[s]hipowners insure against loss of or damage to their ships with Hull
Underwriters. However, they look to the P & I Clubs for insurance against their liabilities to
others.”74 Thornton might consider a P&I club an analogue to a group captive.75 Liu and Faure
posit “risk-sharing agreements play an important role in providing… compensation” after an
incident, “but can equally, via the mutual monitoring inherent in risk pooling contribute to
efficient prevention.” 76 Thus, “[r]isk sharing may be especially attractive in case of new
technologies… where operators themselves may be in the best position to assess the risk and
hence to impose preventive measures via mutual monitoring.” 77 However, Liu and Faure argue
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“a relative homogeneity of the risks involved is crucial for the successful functioning of risk
sharing pools,” and “[t]oo great heterogeneity may prevent the emergence of a risk-sharing pool
or lead to cross-subsidization and hence create suboptimal deterrent incentives.”78 Kunstadter
also believes homogeneity is virtually required for a potential space P&I club to function for
essentially the same reasons.79 How homogeneity enters the equation as a factor is examined,
but at least some P&I clubs to provide cover to marine craft from small (the size of a yacht) to
extremely large (a vessel the size of Ever Given, for example).
Risk-sharing agreements “[resemble] insurance in pooling risks,” but a major difference
is “under an insurance policy risks are shifted to a third party (the insurance company); whereas
in a risk sharing scheme, the operators are both insured and insurer; there is hence no
involvement of a third party.”80 If a risk-pooling system is ideally functioning,
the average premium/contribution should be aligned with the risk profile
of most members in a particular pool. However, if the risk different insured
possess varies significantly, the good risks whose expected damage is less
than the premium/contribution will leave the pool. Only the members with
a higher risk have strong incentives to stay.81
Thus, it is important to 1) “[create] the right preventive incentives for insurance and risk-sharing
pools,” and 2) to implement the monitoring function “either by insurers or other parties in the
risk pool is also crucial to ensure the deterrent effect,” or act as incident prevention (whether a
party is taking excessive risks or even acting in a reckless or negligent manner).82 For example,
one serious problem in marine pollution is “the deplorable practice adopted by certain
irresponsible Masters of deliberately discharging oil into the seas, usually as tank washings,”

78

Liu and Faure, 257.
(Chris Kunstadter, pers. comm., 2/21/2022)
80
Liu and Faure, 260.
81
Liu and Faure, 260.
82
Liu and Faure, 260.
79

28
which affects a P&I club in the form of fines for which it provides cover.83 Clark offers this as
evidence that “[t]he ability of the P & I Clubs to respond to this new and increasing risk is proof
of [clubs’] vitality and the flexibility of the insurance market to provide the necessary cover.”84
All said, “[i]t is in the interests of all other members’ claims to be as low as possible, and thus a
mutual interest of risk minimization is created.85
At the time of Liu and Faure’s writing, the P&I club pooling agreement made US$3.1
billion available to cover … potential liability,” with a limitation of $1 billion for oil pollution.86
In an application for club membership, according to Liu and Faure, P&I clubs “are more
interested in the ‘condition of the vessel as a potential source of liabilities; for example, its
ability to carry cargo or passengers or crew carefully,’” and “[b]ased on the surveys, the clubs
decide whether to reject or accept the vessels with a ‘Defects Warranty’ whereby any claim
arising out of defects noted during the survey would be excluded from the cover… .”87
Essentially, clubs “try to tailor the premiums to the risks the vessels are exposed to.”88 As
additional background, a P&I Club
provides more services than a pure insurer and operates as a mixture
of an insurance company, a law firm and a loss adjuster. Besides
offering an insurance coverage, a P&I Club can also provide a
worldwide network of correspondents and representatives to give
on-the-spot assistance to the shipowner when required, give Letters
of Undertaking to offer a security when members’ vessels are
arrested and assist in claims handling and settlement.89
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Thus, it is of note that P&I clubs provide many more services in a membership through its dues,
including some legal services and instant access to an expert. As a significant example, a
P & I Solicitor on the spot shortly after an incident occurs is to assist
the [shipowner] and to ascertain whether any prosecution is likely
to eventuate from the incident. If so, the solicitor needs to ascertain
whether any defence is open to the master or owners. If there is, it
may be possible to persuade the relevant port authority of that fact
and either a prosecution is not brought or it is discontinued. In cases
where it is not possible to persuade the port authority that the facts
do give rise to a defence, then obviously a prosecution follows.”90
It is important to note a P&I club has limits to its coverage, as “not all the areas of risk
for which the P&I clubs provide cover can actually be regarded as insured risks,” and those
limits “depend upon the extent of discretionary provisions in the club rules and will vary from
club to club.”91 But Liu and Faure argue P&I clubs “can provide an alternative when
commercial insurance fails to emerge due to the lack of information or associated high costs,”
and Springall believes “P & I Clubs, with their support for the concept of a sharing of liability
for oil pollution damage between tanker owners and cargo interests, will continue to have a
dominant involvement in both the introduction and implementation of voluntary oil pollution
liability and compensation schemes.”92,93
In relevance to the space industry, Harrington touches on the fact that some space
insurance companies offer third party space insurance policies, and some of those include
separate items for “service interruption, loss of revenue, broadcast events; and ‘captive cover’
(an insurance company created by an entity or group to provide insurance for itself) to assist
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those companies which self-insure their space risks.”94 However, Harrington states these third
party policies are “likely… to be extremely expensive and difficult to procure. Thus, the lack of
standard coverage in the marketplace that can be endorsed to address the needs of particular
entrepreneurial endeavors hinders development of such endeavors. The refinement and
standardization of satellite-oriented insurance offerings would also contribute to increased
insurance capacity at lower premium, allowing additional entrants to the satellite market. Such
standards are particularly relevant for those developing countries wishing to develop space
capabilities.”95 Importantly, it is this third-party liability space insurance that “provides coverage
to [parties] not involved in the space activity or [insurance] contract, and is a particularly
important developing area… .”96
Analysis and Discussion
Risk in Space Activity
According to Jim Wetherbee, “[a]voiding tragedy, while performing noble missions at
peak effectiveness, is the holy grail of organizations trying to operate in hazardous
environments.”97 He explains further, “[f]or long-term viability of a company, a profitability
motive is always desired,” but if that company is to ultimately succeed, it will also need to
continuously monitor the system to “[detect] decremental changes” and “prevent drift toward the
next accident.” 98 Wetherbee states, “[g]ood executives [use the proper leadership skills to]
emphasize working [together in a high-quality and safe way] to accomplish goals, contribute to
society, and increase the long-term value of the organization,” all while confronting hazards.99
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Wetherbee explains there is a zone between “catastrophe or bankruptcy,” and can be summarized
as follows:
What’s the goal of your organization? The goal is to accomplish as
much as possible using high-quality processes – with no accidents.
How do you do that? You follow the standards and practices of
operating excellence. What are the standards? They are the entire
collection of written policies, rules, and procedures for operating.
What are the practices? They are the established processes,
techniques, methods, decisions you make, and actions you take to
operate well. Why does this work? Here’s the beauty and elegance
of this concept. People with experience in operations developed the
standards and practices using knowledge of previous accidents and
financial problems in your industry. So the standards and practices
inherently describe how to operate within the boundaries of
catastrophe and bankruptcy. They also include the current
constraints of operations, maintenance, engineering, regulations, the
condition of the equipment, and readiness of the people. The
standards and practices represent the collective wisdom of your
organization on how best to accomplish operating tasks, activities,
jobs, and roles, in service of the mission.”100
Realizing a company needs to maintain profitability to remain competitive and “enhance
their ability to contribute to society into the future,” Wetherbee also states the company must
“prevent accidents to survive.” But “[m]any managers seem to believe” safety and profitability
compete – “Safety requires investments in time and money, which decrease the bottom line of
profits in the short term.”101 If a company disregards safety measures in the interest of shortterm profit and results, “accidents will follow, which will destroy any short-term improvement”
and could lead to serious harm or damage to property, a mission, or even “kill[ing] people [(if
humans are involved in the situation)], if not the whole organization.”102 Thus, “systematic
directives developed and implemented by the leaders in the organization to help the workforce
conduce their jobs effectively in a safe and productive manner,” is required. Wetherbee explains
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these methods may be contained in a “Safety Management System in the organization,” but this
author posits extending the scope of these methods and whether they can also be considered part
of policy, even out to a global level.103
One example of a safety measure a company in the space industry could put in place is a
technology readiness level (TRL). For example, NASA’s TRL has nine levels – 1 is the lowest,
and 9 is the highest.104 To be considered “flight qualified,” a spacecraft requires a TRL 8, which
means it is “in its final configuration,” has been “successfully demonstrated through test and
analysis,” its software has been thoroughly debugged, and user/training documentation is
complete.105 to insure ‘flight qualified’ hardware.” 106 It has been previously stated that the
satellite industry is risk-averse by nature, therefore “designers are pressured to incorporate
proven (i.e., legacy) hardware on space systems” because risks associated with this legacy
hardware are relatively known factors.107 However, “[a]lthough the use of proven technology
helps to mitigate mission risk, it also has the negative effect of limiting satellite performance and
stalling industry innovation.”108 Some relatively recent technological innovation and
development in the satellite industry and risks pertaining thereto will be examined later in this
paper.
In a commercial sense, if a spacecraft does fail, operators’ responses can be varied. A
“larger [operator] can rely on existing free capacity to cover any potential service shortfall and
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may in extremis relocate satellites” to cover any gaps in its service areas.109 This author will
interpret “larger operator” to include constellations of SmallSats as well as large conventional
satellites operated by large companies. However, a smaller operator, such as a small business or
educational organization, likely would not have the assets nor means to relocate a large
conventional satellite or several smaller satellites, or otherwise “free up capacity” to provide
service.110
In the case of a commercial endeavor, perhaps through the use of innovative technology,
a business may desire to extend a satellite’s life or may accept a loss of the satellite (and
therefore any potential future revenue generated by it). As an example, several years ago,
Intelsat “stated that they would use an insurance payout to reduce debt levels following the loss
of [one of its satellites] through launcher failure, as the satellite had… expensive… capability
which had not found a customer and so a cheaper replacement would be ordered.”111 Again, a
small business might not be able to “order a cheaper replacement,” but if its spacecraft was lost
during launch, it would be covered by some sort of launch insurance, thus the business would be
able to “use an insurance payout.” However, if the loss of a satellite occurred on orbit and
remained there as a defunct craft, and especially if it were to cause issues like conjunction risks,
what actions would a small operator have and how might it protect itself with regard to potential
third-party liability? How are operators, especially smaller operators, assessing and planning to
manage risks such as these? These questions are explored in greater detail below.
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Turning back to the concept of operating risk in the space environment, Dr. Jah states
“You’re basically trying to mitigate Murphy’s law.”112 He further explains there are always risks
and “there’s always something that comes up that’s not necessarily nominal,” but if an entity
“do[es] a good job with [its] dress rehearsals, then [it] can identify where problems could arise
and plans for how to take care of them in short order.” 113 Jah States “[o]ne of the things I
learned at JPL is: Excellence is not something that happens when you walk out the door for the
first time. It happens because you do things over and over and over again,” which echoes
Wetherbee’s emphasis on the importance of implementation of safety measures and control.114
If an accident were to occur, an entity may develop and implement “corrective actions…
to help the organization prevent future accidents.” 115 These “corrective actions” could “include
constraints in the form of new rules and procedures for operators to follow,” and they “may be
successful, for a while, in preventing similar potential accidents from occurring under similar
conditions from known causes.”116
However, risks and “operational situations” change constantly; “new rules become outof-date, confusing, ineffective, erroneous, and ignored.”117 Wetherbee states “[i]nvestigators can
determine why the decisions made and actions taken seemed appropriate to the managers and
operators who were under the influence of the sociotechnical system [of the organization],” thus
corrective actions that “have a greater chance of helping the organization prevent future
accidents” can be developed [and implemented] to improve the sociotechnical system so
managers and operators in the future will not be influenced in the same way they were in the past
112
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before the previous accidents.”118 In other words, these corrective actions could be implemented
at the overall organizational level in the form of policies that guide the management of the entity,
not only the operational work instructions in specific areas (for example, proper procedures for
soldering).
A danger to organizational policies is “Allowed Violation of Rules, Policies, and
Procedures,” as we will see with the example of Swarm Technologies later in this study. At
times, after an accident occurs, “investigators… [determine] that some organizational rules,
policies, and procedures were violated before the accident.” 119 Sometimes workers “reported
unofficially that some managers were cognizant of these violations in operations before the
accident.” 120 And “[i]n some cases… managers [even] condoned violations in an effort to entice
greater production or faster results.” 121 Often, workers are “willing to take excessive risks to
satisfy their managers,” and sometimes this willingness to take excessive risks is out of concern
for one’s job or retaliation, thus reinforcing the idea of “going along with” management’s
decisions, even when they are dangerous or even in violation of regulations.122
Not ignoring the concern surrounding best STM practices, overall, when it comes to onorbit activity, some industry experts remind us that space is vast and odds of a collision are
actually low. A collision occasionally occurs, but in terms of individual entities, the chances of
one’s particular single spacecraft hitting another spacecraft is, again, low. It can be described in
degrees of separation: the distance of 250 miles, the distance between the Earth’s surface and
LEO, is approximately the distance between Washington, DC and New York City. If one degree
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of separation is 250 miles, it could be said that an example of a collision would be if a minivan
hit another minivan on the road between Washington, DC and NYC. The question arises of what
the chances are of that actually occurring.123
Companies like SpaceX and Amazon with their communications constellations are
primarily seeking the lowest latency possible in delivering their signals, thus they desire to
operate on as low an orbit as possible. Of note, this is the particular altitude where “things will
get crowded.” However, if a spacecraft operates on an orbit that is “just a little higher,” there
will only be a few more milliseconds of latency, and a higher orbit has less drag, so there is even
a possibility of a longer lifetime. According to industry experts, a few milliseconds of latency
will not be very noticeable, and the benefit of operating on a higher orbit may actually be
appealing to an operator due to the possibility of less drag and longer life. Thus, operating on a
slightly higher orbit could be viewed as a risk mitigation strategy and a good STM practice, not
only for sustaining the space environment, but for business, as well.124
Space Traffic Management
The question may arise as to why space traffic management is such a concern, especially
orbital debris. Why do we continue to discuss it, and why might we need so many laws, policies,
guidelines, best practices, and regulations that pertain to it? Here, an overarching background
and big picture background using current space traffic statistics is provided. From 1957 through
December 31, 2021, there have been approximately 5,682 launches of objects into Earth’s
orbit.125,126 As our technology progresses, and access to space has become less expensive and
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more readily available, the number of space actors is increasing. Thus, logically, the amount of
space activity is increasing as well.127 In 2014, the number of nations and government consortia
conducting activity in space reached over 60.128 As of March 2022, the total was 111.129 It is
said that space is becoming increasingly “congested, contested, and competitive,”130 and a
greater number of players leads to an increase of objects on orbit.
Closely monitoring LEO is crucial due to the amount of very small objects, namely one
millimeter or even smaller.131 As of 2020, there were 400 missions operating between 600 and
1000 km in altitude (approximately 373 and 621 miles), and one aspect of particular concern
was, at the time, the “lack of data on millimeter-sized OD above 600 km” in altitude.132 The
concern is “[t]here is far more small debris than large debris,” and “mission-ending risk for most
operational spacecraft is driven by small, millimeter-sized OD.”133 An example of a collision
leading to not only loss of an active commercial satellite and therefore loss of revenue, but the
creation of a cloud of debris, occurred between the defunct Russian satellite Cosmos 2251 and
Iridium 33 in 2009 (discussed later in this paper).
However, this should not detract from the possibility that incidents can or will not occur
on other orbits, such as GEO. According to risk estimates concluded by a collaboration of teams
at Analytical Graphics Inc (AGI), SES S.A., and Inmarsat, “the chances of collision in GEO are
up to four orders of magnitude higher than some estimates have suggested, and those collisions
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can occur at much higher relative velocities than previously thought.”134 Alarmingly, “[t]he
researchers predict that the population of active GEO satellites can be expected to suffer one
potentially mission-terminating impact every four years on average.”135 It is important to note
that “the majority of space commerce is currently conducted” on GEO.136 Further, it was found
that “due to the existence of GEO-crossing debris in eccentric orbits… impacts are energetic
enough to cause catastrophic damage to satellites, which are not designed with mechanical
robustness in mind.”137 Thus, “’In contrast to low Earth orbits, the GEO satellites are essentially
sitting ducks with limited ability to evade the space debris flow.’”138 Though orbital debris does
occur more frequently in GEO than originally thought, for the purposes of this research, the
study will be limited to activity on LEO.
We have a lot of traffic in space; some functional, some defunct, and a seemingly
incalculable number of “bits and pieces” that we are not able to track at this current time. This
debris and especially these nontrackable “bits and pieces” are causing problems and are
becoming alarming. The increasing number of objects on orbit concerns us because the more
crowded orbit gets, the greater the potential is for spacecraft “fender benders” or worse. As of
March 2022, U.S. Space Force’s Space Domain Awareness squadron, the 18 SPCS’ SpaceTrack.org website listed 25,666 objects in its public satellite catalog (SATCAT) that were onorbit at the time of writing.139 18 SCPS adds that there is one particular group of satellites
considered unfit for public disclosure (“analyst objects”), further explained as objects “about
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which the origin is unknown or the data remains [sic] confidential.”140 These tracked objects are
human-made objects 10cm in diameter (about the size of a softball) or larger currently orbiting
the Earth.141,142 Roughly 4,852 of the 25,402 known objects (about 19%) are operational
satellites, which means the vast majority (approximately 81%) of the known, tracked objects are
non-functional, or debris.143 Further, it is estimated that between 500,000 and 800,000 objects
between 1cm and 10cm in diameter144, and hundreds of millions of objects smaller than 1cm in
diameter145 reside in orbit. Orbital debris is typically categorized as very small (less than 1
millimeter wide), small (less than 1 centimeter wide), medium (1 to 10 centimeters wide), or
large (greater than 10 centimeters wide).146 Typically, very small debris can be shielded against,
but an object that size still “has the potential to damage satellite sub-systems or pierce an
astronaut’s protective suit.”147 The greatest concern lies with medium-sized debris as it too small
to be catalogued and tracked,148 but “poses a lethal threat to operational satellites.”149
If orbital debris is left unchecked, our ability to conduct space activity is severely put at
risk. Jakhu, et al. explain, “[s]pace debris seriously threatens the sustainability of space
utilization since it is considered to be an emerging navigation hazard to functional or operating
satellites.”150 Some studies have shown LEO is rapidly approaching the “tipping point” at which
our space-based capabilities may begin to decrease.
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The event known as the Kessler syndrome, named for Donald J. Kessler, former NASA
scientist who along with Burt Cour-Palais “laid the scientific groundwork” for the study of
effects of satellite collisions, spacecraft would collide with one another, creating debris in the
process, which would, in turn, strike other craft, to the point where debris “would hit a critical
point where it grew at a rate faster than the rate at which debris is removed from orbit through
natural decay into the Earth’s atmosphere,” leading to “collisional cascading” where smaller
pieces of debris would collide with larger pieces of debris, “creating... new pieces of small debris
which could then collide with other large pieces.”151 A Kessler event would significantly hinder
if not prevent access to space, and severely impair capability.
Space/Maritime Analogue
As Goessler states, maritime law and space law can be seen as analogous because of their
overlapping or ambiguous jurisdictions, especially the high seas’ similarity to LEO.152 A
waterway or canal could be viewed as similar to “orbital highways” on different orbits in outer
space, and if a situation were to happen where spacecraft began to become “backed up in traffic,”
such as the Ever Given ship that became lodged in the Suez Canal in 2021, we could experience
a serious disruption of space-based capability, if not the dreaded Kessler Event.153 Thus, it is
crucial that we implement practices that consider the “ecological conditions” of different orbits
as the crews working to dislodge the Ever Given worked with their environment – not against it.
154
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develop.155 We could not only use comprehensive gathering and tracking of good space
environment data to “aid in orbital salvage practices,” but farther into the realm of STM and all
space activity, in general, to help reach space environment sustainability goals set forth in laws,
policies, and regulations.156
The space environment/maritime environment analogue does not perfectly align, but as
Goessler and the NSS state, we can still identify and use similar concepts to help us develop
solutions for managing space activity and, ideally, preventing collisions or other accidents on
orbit.157 A governing body could step in and implement methods to prevent bad behavior on
orbit, perhaps in the form of regulations, and lay a framework to help facilitate space
sustainability by creating a marketplace for entities to grow within the field of technological
STM solutions. In other words, a government could help set up a structure in which space
entities could develop.158
But to do so, we as a society must consider the fact that the space environment is, as Jah
states, like an ecosystem similar to the ocean, and will need to be protected from suffering the
tragedy of the commons any further.159 This author would like to highlight the fact that Dr. Jah
is also involved in the WEF’s Space Sustainability Rating initiative, discussed further below in
this paper. Jah advocates “space sustainability metrics … a [quantifiable] ‘space traffic’
footprint,’” similar to a carbon footprint.160 Indeed, setting quantifiable metrics could help actors
develop a system in which entities (perhaps, most likely, in the form of a governing body) issue a
penalty for leaving a defunct spacecraft on orbit that might endanger other craft or crews. Such a

155

Goessler, “#SpaceWatchGL Opinion.
Goessler, “#SpaceWatchGL Opinion. .
157
Goessler, “#SpaceWatchGL Opinion.
158
David, “Space Junk Removal Is Not Going Smoothly,” April 14, 2021.
159
David, “Space Junk Removal Is Not Going Smoothly,” April 14, 2021.
160
David, “Space Junk Removal Is Not Going Smoothly,” April 14, 2021.
156

42
system might also spark actors to further develop innovative technology in a nascent ADR
industry, similar to commercial salvage activity in the maritime environment.161
A salvage entity might also theoretically relieve some concerns regarding liability
because it would help “clear some of the path” on orbit.162 It is true, however, that the current
legal regime presents challenges to ADR as it actually disincentivizes it, particularly the OST and
Liability Convention. 163 Ownership of a spacecraft is extremely difficult to determine even if
that craft was registered with the UN pursuant to the Registration Convention and other domestic
policy and/or regulation, let alone if it were unregistered and/or unclaimed.”164 As discussed, the
burden of proof for determination of a craft that inflicts damage on another craft would lie with
the harmed party, thus compensation and/or restitution to the harmed party may be unresolved.165
A key point this author would like to explore is the NSS’ theory that
When aircraft create debris consequent to catastrophic failure over
land, it is usually confined to one identifiable terrestrial area.
Conversely, ocean vessels sometimes suffer loss of control, are
shipwrecked, or contaminate large swaths of the maritime
environment with mobile debris: solid objects, such as abandoned
vessels, flotsam and jetsam; or liquids, such as oil. Such
consequences of catastrophic failure and normal operations also
result in the outer space environment, where whole defunct
spacecraft and other debris remain uncontrolled in orbit.166
This author does not completely agree that the space environment is necessarily overall more like
the maritime environment than aviation environment, but the above point regarding the location
of debris created by spacecraft analogous to debris created by ships or other ocean vessels will be
a focus. Namely, as the NSS emphasizes, in stating the fact that “orbital debris is pollution.”167
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One downside to using the maritime environment as an analogue for the space
environment is the fact that “because of unique liability provisions of the international space
treaties… maritime strategies cannot be applied wholesale.”168 For example, the NSS states “the
current international regime for compensation for damage caused by oil pollution is based on two
conventions: International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 (CLC
69) and International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971 (Fund 1971), an intergovernmental entity that
provides access to liability compensation funds only to CLC 69 State Parties.”169
The CLC 69 ensures “adequate compensation is available to persons who suffer oil
pollution damage resulting from maritime casualties involving oil-carrying ships.” 170 It covers
“pollution damage resulting from spills of persistent oils suffered in the territory (including the
territorial sea) of a State Party to the Convention.” 171 Further, CLC 69 “requires ships covered
by it to maintain insurance or other financial security in sums equivalent to the owner's total
liability for one incident.” 172 However, the insurance requirement only applies to ships carrying
more than 2,000 tons of oil, but they are required to maintain insurance specifically “in respect of
oil pollution damage.”173 Specific financial details of the cost of oil pollution coverage in a
conventional insurance policy was not acquired for this study, but if space insurance is used as
an analogue, it might be assumed that such an additional line could be as costly as tailored space
insurance policies as described by Harrington.

168

NSS, 3.
NSS, 3-4.
170
“International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC),” International Maritime
Organization, accessed April 3, 2022, https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/International-Conventionon-Civil-Liability-for-Oil-Pollution-Damage-(CLC).aspx.
171
“International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC)”.
172
“International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC)”.
173
“International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC)”.
169

44
Fund 1971, as the NSS position paper states, “provide[s] financial compensation for oil
pollution damage that occurs in Member States, resulting from spills of persistent oil from
tankers.” 174 It is funded by “contributions paid by entities that receive certain types of oil by sea
transport, and the “contributions are based on the amount of oil received in the relevant calendar
year, and cover expected claims, together with the costs of administering the Funds.” 175 Of note,
and as of this writing, Fund 1971 has “been involved in 150 incidents of varying sizes all over
the world. In the great majority of cases, all claims have been settled out of court.”176 Such an
IGO could be another possible solution for a space liability pool of funds, but details of founding
such an entity warrant further and deeper research.
However, the NSS states
the main principles and provisions of CLC 69 cannot be used in the
space context for two main reasons: First, the general principle
provided in CLC 69 is that those causing the pollution should pay
the compensation. However, as noted above, often the party
causing the orbital debris cannot be determined. And second,
Article III of CLC 69 makes the owner of the ship strictly liable
even in the absence of any fault.177
Here, the CLC 69 conflicts with Art. III of the Liability Convention which states the “launching
State is absolutely liable only if damage is done on Earth or to aircraft in flight,” but is “liable
based on fault if damage occurs in outer space.” 178 Further, as a reminder, multiple States can
simultaneously bear joint and several liability.”179
Of note, A.F. Bessemer Clark points out P&I clubs “are, and have always been, staunch
supporters of C.L.C. and the Fund Convention,” as it “has the inestimable advantage of
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providing one system for the resolution of all disputes, government claims, third party claims and
Owners' clean-up.”180 CLC 69 requires a shipowner to “maintain insurance or equivalent
security to cover himself against liabilities arising under the respective legislation up to the limits
therein set out,” and such evidence of “‘financial responsibility’ must be carried on board each of
the Owners vessels caught by the legislation.”181 Importantly, P&I clubs “have agreed to provide
the necessary evidence of financial responsibility for each of their members affected by this
legislation” by issuing certificates “which the Clubs issue to the appropriate authorities.’”182 It is
not insignificant that certain authorities have accepted certificates issued by P&I clubs as proof
of “financial responsibility” because it could be interpreted that insurance is not, in and of itself,
the only method to prove said financial responsibility, thus potentially relieving a shipowner of
bearing the full burden of carrying a large and costly maritime insurance policy.
Despite the issue with regard to determination of who is at fault for any damages and
who, according to some existing maritime convention, shall be held liable for damages, the NSS
states there are still “other maritime traditions and legal regimes from which we can draw helpful
lessons.”183 For example, MARPOL “deals with the prevention of pollution by oil or chemicals,
or by harmful substances in packaged form, sewage, and garbage,” and “provides various
harmful discharge prohibitions,” as well as lays down “a mechanism to check the seaworthiness
of a ship by providing a framework for the certification of ships with respect to safety and
pollution compliance.”184 Notably, there can be some similarities drawn from the provisions of
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MARPOL in the limits/prohibition of release of noxious liquids and garbage, which could be
seen as an analogue for the release of debris from a spacecraft.
Looking specifically at potential space salvage activity, “the concept of special
compensation beyond pure [marine] property salvage for preventing environmental damage is
addressed in the “International Convention on Salvage, 1989 (Salvage Convention),” which
“considers protection of the environment (even beyond oils spills, for debris) as part of salvage
and therefore subject to reward if contamination is prevented by the salvor” 185 (emphasis added).
This “‘liability salvage” is officially termed ‘special compensation’ by the [Salvage]
Convention… .” 186 But “acquiring ‘special compensation’… proved to be time-consuming and
somewhat limited, [thus] an alternative system for awarding special compensation, known as the
Special Compensation Protection and Indemnity Clause (SCOPIC),” and of note, SCOPIC was
developed jointly by P&I Clubs, salvors, underwriters, and ship owners.187 SCOPIC’s
importance as a set of specific clauses that can be included in a salvage (or even an ADR)
agreement is recognized, but these details will not be discussed within the scope of this paper.
Insurance
Insurance can be summed up as “a contract, represented by a policy, in which an
individual or entity receives financial protection or reimbursement against losses from an
insurance company.” 188 Subsequently, the company “pools clients’ risks to make payments
more affordable for the insured.”189
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Harrington states “[o]ne of the primary concerns with regard to… innovative [space]
activities [(such as CubeSats, constellations, and OOS)] is the unavailability of standardized
insurance.” Individualized tailored policies, or “manuscripted” policies, “tend to be expensive
both due to the amount of work that goes into producing them and, more importantly, due to the
uncertainty of the risks involved.” 190 So, Harrington states, “[a]n understanding of the ways in
which law and regulations impact these activities will help insurers produce more efficiently
priced insurance, and thus may also help new entrants to the space insurance market take on
some of these risks.”191 Thus, the importance of laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines is
reiterated, especially Harrington’s theory of using an insurance contract as governance, and how
each instrument can work together in forming a system to guide the industry toward best STM
practices.
For the purposes of this paper, the fact that there are typically three types of insurance is
acknowledged: first party, second party, and third party, but third-party liability and damages to
parties outside the insurance contract between insurer and insured will be the subject examined
within the scope of this paper. Harrington states third-party insurance “is carried specifically to
pay for damage and loss caused to others.” 192 Further, “[n]o third party liability claims have
been made in over two hundred commercial launches licensed in the US since 1989,” and other
than the Cosmos 954 incident, “the only third-party liability claim made worldwide was in the
amount of US$1mil for ground contamination in Kazakhstan as a result of a failed Proton launch
in 2007.” 193 Thus, even taking Cosmos 954 into account, “this is a low probability area of
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accidents with high potential losses.”194 Of note, the Kazakhstan incident occurred due to a
launch failure, not a deorbiting spacecraft, and its importance is recognized, it is beyond the
scope of this research.
As background, according to Harrington, “in 2018, roughly two-thirds of launched
satellites globally carried some form of insurance.”195 Further, “a single rocket crash in 2019
cost space insurers over $411 million dollars.”196 Additionally, “[t]he standard premium cost for
launch insurance ranges from 5 to 20 percent of the satellite’s value; with the market expected to
settle in this phase at around 10 percent.”197 Note, however, this approximation is for launch
insurance; third party liability insurance is likely to be much higher. Further, Harrington states
“[t]his high cost of insurance and relatively low capacity of the market acts as a barrier to entry
in the space industry for emerging companies,” and especially “[i]n an era when… private
companies are encouraged… to participate in space activities,” such as in the development of
innovative technology to address space sustainability, “it is critically important that the insurance
industry be ready and able to provide the necessary coverage to support the space industry.”198
Harrington states before the CSLA was enacted, the unavailability of space insurance
“for the immense liability faced by launch providers,” was causing the US commercial space
industry to falter.199 The CSLA “was able to reverse the degradation of the space industry in the
United States” by enacting the cross-waiver requirement, but the cross-waivers did not “solve the
problem of the limited availability and expense of insurance.”200 Further, though the crosswaivers “rendered the participation in space activities possible without [bearing the whole
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burden] of insurance, it is unquestionable that the availability of reasonably priced,
comprehensive insurance would encourage further growth and development.”201 Especially
when aligned with existing regulations, policies, and guidelines, as having an insurance policy in
place would help companies manage risk and liability, which would seemingly encourage it to
undertake innovative endeavors, but to do so in a safe and compliant manner.
Entities manage risk by transferring it away from themselves, and insurers take on that
risk.202 Insurance can be part of a larger picture of how a company handles risk along with risk
avoidance and acceptance – in other words, a company can decide whether a risk is worth taking.
However, if insurers take on a risk that could have a severe impact, even if the risk of such an
impact is low, a high insurance claim payout could be catastrophic for the space insurance
industry and the effects could ripple throughout all space activity.203 In concert with what is
arguably a restrictive legal regime with regard to liability, a space insurance industry in “limpmode” could put a halt to developing space industry.204
Especially since conventional insurance policies typically cover losses including
collisions with debris and other space objects, other than specific exclusions such as war and
cybersecurity incidents, some space insurers believe these risks are too great to accept and are
exiting the market. This, too, could mean if too many insurers exit the space insurance market,
there would be a negative impact to developing space industry. 205
Tools exist to address space traffic risks, such as the capability to
accurately track objects down to 2 centimeters and provide collision
warnings in a timely manner is improving with new, globally
dispersed radars, inexpensive tracking beacons for satellites, and
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data sharing. Small, reliable propulsion systems allow satellite
operators to perform collision-avoidance maneuvers and postmission disposal. Active debris removal (ADR), life extension, and
other forms of on-orbit servicing (OOS) are revolutionizing satellite
end-of-life (EOL) activities.”206
If we have these capabilities, we have the knowledge base from which to implement the rules
and procedures proposed by Wetherbee on a larger scale and use such guidance in forming a
framework in which to place laws, regulations, policies, best practices, and insurance (and other
types of commercial contracts) together to help create a nascent standardized STM system.
However, some roadblocks would still exist. If we take ADR as an example, Kunstadter
states “[t]here is currently no requirement to remove objects from orbit, and there is no legal
foundation for an entity from a country that is not the State of registry to remove an object from
orbit,” or to be forced to do so. 207 Further, “[a] State could remove its own object (bearing
responsibility and liability) or could allow another State’s entity to do so, but if the “client
object” colluded with the “servicing vehicle,” then “under the Liability Convention, the
launching States of both the original object and the retrieval object could bear joint and several
liability.”208 Though some industry experts believe the risk of that happening may be low, the
situation could still lead to a tangled web of complex legal and regulatory intricacy.
However, Kunstadter continues, “while there is little incentive for States to create
additional hazard and take on additional liability by performing [ADR], governments have a
responsibility to lead efforts” toward it. 209 He states “[a] recent study demonstrated that while
the greatest debris-generating potential is from spent Russian rocket bodies in LEO, the most
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likely collisions among these objects are with U.S. and Chinese debris objects.” 210 Kunstadter
recommends “[c]ollaboration on an ADR demonstration by the responsible space agencies—
NASA, Roscosmos, and the [CNSA]” to “kick-start the ADR industry and build confidence that
viable, affordable solutions exist.”211 While international collaboration is certainly welcome and
even specifically advised in some of the policies and guidelines, in this current political climate,
NASA’s collaboration with the two other subject parties is virtually impossible.212 However,
also as previously discussed, we have now seen the successful demonstration of ADR performed
by China, so we can hope commercially viable ADR solutions will come to fruition.
Historically, space insurance policies “have protected devices against loss, failure or
damage from launch through their orbiting life…” and “[o]perators could add liability coverage
in case one satellite damages another or re-enters the atmosphere in a way that causes damage or
injury on the ground.” 213 But the “surging collision risks have left the handful of insurers that
offer satellite coverage pulling back or exiting the market, executives and analysts said,” though
certainly, according to Kunstadter, not all space insurers are pulling coverage. However, the
number of space insurers who are leaving is not insignificant. According to Richard Parker, cofounder of Assure Space (a unit of AmTrust Financial), “‘[t]his is a real issue for insurance,’ as
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the company stopped providing spacecraft insurance in LEO in 2020, and “the few policies it has
sold since then exclude collision damage.”214
But “[s]pace coverage has been a lucrative niche for insurers, which took in $475 million
in gross premiums to cover satellites, rockets and unmanned space flights” in 2020, and paid
“$425 million in losses, according to Seradata.” 215 Peter Elson, CEO of insurance broker
Gallagher Aerospace, states “[s]pace premiums are 10-20 times aviation premiums.”216 Despite
the fact that LEO is the focus of industry experts’ concern for most risk, “LEO satellites are
much smaller than GEO satellites,” and need “$500,000 to $1 million worth of coverage, far
below the $200 million to $300 million for those in the GEO, industry experts said.”217
According to Denis Bousquet, in 2021, “‘About half of new satellite launches [had]
insurance,’” and “[i]ndustry sources expect more policies to exclude collision coverage and
fewer satellites to have insurance at all.”218 But also as of 2021, “Only 11 spacecraft have
suffered a partial or total failure due to suspected debris strikes over the past decade, according
to Seradata, making insurer worries largely theoretical for now,” but “Assure Space's Parker said
he is confident a major collision will occur within the next three years, rendering insurance
nearly impossible to obtain.”219 Still, at present, “‘[t]here are no signs such a situation is
imminent,’” but “‘[such a situation] would render entire orbits uninsurable… .’” 220 For now,
“[n]ew insurers may enter the market to alleviate supply-demand strains,” but “[u]ntil then,
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industry experts said companies, universities and government agencies will likely bear more
financial responsibility.”221
Regarding risk, echoing the theory of industry experts in the Overview of Risk section of
this paper, the risk of damage to a second party on orbit is low. For example, if one spacecraft
were conducting an OOS mission for a second spacecraft, and the OOS spacecraft bumped its
client’s spacecraft too hard and, subsequently, the client’s spacecraft became defunct as a result
of the impact, the client (second party) would address the claim through the contractual
arrangement between the OOS provider and the client. Industry experts state they are unable to
picture a scenario where that is a real risk about which entities should worry.222 But the fact that
there is some concern regarding the fact that some space insurers are leaving the market due to
increasing risks of operation in LEO emphasizes the importance of the insurance industry’s place
in the space industry.
According to AXA XL’s website, in addition to launch coverage, it offers coverage for:
•

Post-separation coverage for spacecraft through initial operations, deployments, orbit
raising and testing

•

In-orbit coverage for ongoing operations of satellites through their life

•

Coverage for transponder users, including loss of revenue and extra expenses

•

Specialized coverage for small satellites and unique missions

•

Launch and in-orbit liability coverage223

AXA XL also specifically calls out the fact that they “also support development of unique
missions, payloads and capabilities from new, entrepreneurial space organizations.” 224
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Thus, despite the fact that some insurers seem to be pulling their lines of coverage for
space activities, especially in LEO, at least one of the major space insurers remains in the arena.
Not only does this provide on-orbit coverage, but specifically states it carries specialized
coverage for small satellites and “unique missions” (perhaps similar to those discussed in the
ODMSP guidelines, such as ADR and OOS). Additionally, there are likely other types of
specific types of space insurance in the works.225 It is a step in the opposite direction from the
exiting space insurers, so it can be interpreted that there is still a niche for space insurance and its
continued role in space activity is actually growing, not shrinking.
Some of AXA XL’s pertinent exclusions to its space policies are as follows:
•

War, invasion, hostile or warlike action in time of peace or war, including action in
hindering, combating, or defending against an actual, impending, or expected attack

•

Any anti-satellite device, or device employing atomic or nuclear fission and/or fusion, or
device employing laser or directed energy beams.

•

Confiscation, nationalization, seizure, restraint, detention, appropriation, requisition for title
or use by or under the order of any government or governmental authority or agent (whether
secret or otherwise and/or whether civil, military, or de facto) or public or local authority or
agency.

•

Nuclear reaction, nuclear radiation, or radioactive contamination of any nature, whether such
loss or damage be direct or indirect, except for radiation naturally occurring in the space
environment.
It should also be noted that a typical general policy also excludes:

•

Loss of revenue, incidental damages, consequential loss, or extra expenses, other than
expressly covered under this insurance.

•

Third party liability.226
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It is important to highlight the fact that a typical policy appears not to include coverage
for launch and on-orbit liability coverage, consequential damages (such as loss of revenue), but
such coverage is available. Additionally, revisiting Kunstadter’s comment stating “collisions
with debris and micrometeoroids are generally covered,” it is also important to note this is for
first party coverage, so it would cover that satellite owner/operator in the event its own satellite if
it were to collide with another space object. 227,228
P&I Clubs
To examine the sub-question of whether liability apportionment and risk-pooling are
benefits to members of a P&I club, some background is examined herein. In the maritime
industry, P&I “insurance” provides cover to shipowners and charterers against third-party
liabilities encountered in their commercial operations. Responsibility for damage to cargo, for
pollution, for the death, injury or illness of passengers or crew and for damage to docks and other
installations are examples of typical exposures.”229 Essentially, hull and machinery insurance
policies will cover damage to an owner/operator’s own ship, but P&I coverage would provide
supplemental coverage for third-party liability.230
Running in parallel with a ship's hull and machinery cover, traditional P&I such as that
offered by the American Club distinguishes itself from ordinary forms of marine insurance by
being based on the not-for-profit principle of mutuality where “Members of the Club are both the
insurers and the assureds.”231 A P&I club could be seen as similar to a group captive or risksharing agreement.232 These types of groups might be attractive to small operators as the clubs
227

“Space Insurance,” AXA XL.
Space Insurers, 11.
229
“About the Club” [hereinafter About the Club], The American Club, accessed March 13, 2022,
https://www.american-club.com/page/about-the-club.
230
Springall, 28.
231
About the Club, 2022.
232
(Charles Thornton, pers. comm., 3/18/2022)
228

56
or captives would allow small operators to buy into something larger – they could have an
economy of scale. The group captive could have risks pooled at a lower cost to a small operator
compared to if that small operator bought insurance itself. For example, rather than buying a
$100 thousand policy, perhaps the small operator could purchase coverage from a group captive
for $10 thousand.233
P&I clubs, group captives, and/or risk-sharing agreements could aid in payment of a
claim after an occurrence, but could also facilitate tracking and monitoring of shipping traffic
because it would be in all members’ interests to keep premiums, calls, and/or risks low within
these types of groups or agreements.234 As Liu and Faure posit, risk-sharing could be appealing
to actors who are developing innovative technology where risks may be best identified and
assessed by the actors themselves.235 This “mutual monitoring” might also be seen in space
traffic tracking and monitoring between different entities, such as Privateer and Leo Labs, and
information could be shared among all these actors. Mutual tracking and monitoring have the
potential to prevent malfeasance, as well, because members would theoretically always be
watching for occurrences, thus could deter negative intentional acts, such as deliberately
dumping garbage or oil into the sea. 236 Thus, based on the above, yes, it can be concluded that
liability apportionment and risk-pooling are assets of a P&I club from which members can
benefit.
However, a potential downside to P&I clubs, group captives, and/or risk-sharing
agreements might be the fact that they may require some type of standard or homogeneity of
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members to be successful. 237 Otherwise, allocation of risk may be too varied which could
actually create disincentives for membership or parties to an agreement. 238 However, of note,
some P&I clubs cover a wide spectrum of marine craft from a yacht to an extremely large cargo
carrier, so it could be argued a space P&I club could offer a similar broad spectrum of
membership. It is also important to note that risks and calls or premiums should somehow scale
to meet the needs of each type of craft without disincentivizing other members to participate in a
club. 239 Details of maritime P&I club calls with respect to various types of craft are not
available due to their proprietary nature, but further study is recommended, if data are made
available.
It could also be stated that when a shipowner/operator applies for membership, a P&I
club is more concerned with the potential for the craft to suffer an occurrence (or inflict one upon
another craft).240 If this is the case, if a P&I club deems it necessary, it could accept that
particular member with a “defects warranty;” in other words, an incident that occurs due to a
defect under this warranty would not be covered by the club and would be considered an
exclusion.”241 In essence, the P&I club could be seen as “tailoring” a membership to a member’s
specific needs and situation, which could fill in a gap in which tailored conventional space
insurance policies could be too costly to a small or nascent spacecraft owner/operator, as
Harrington states.242,243 A P&I club also makes some legal services available to members as well
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as adjusters to examine damage after an incident, and could provide immediate assistance in
handling a claim regarding a vessel, which is an added benefit of P&I club membership.244
But though a P&I club states coverage for many incidents is unlimited, it is important to
note this does not mean all risks are always covered all the time. As Liu and Faure explain,
some risks, especially those arising out of the above-referenced “defects warranty” are excluded,
and some other details of a club’s membership may set forth bylaws that give the club discretion
as to what it covers”245 These “defects warranties” have the potential to increase the cost of
membership calls and could restrict coverage a member would be looking to procure, such as
pollution. However, the case remains that P&I clubs can still “provide an alternative when
commercial insurance fails to emerge due to the lack of information or associated high costs,” as
discussed above, and could still have a positive impact on the number of accidents, amount of
pollution, and malfeasance (due to self-monitoring and risk-pooling) in the maritime
environment, which could work as a parallel in the space environment.246,247
In a brief look at the realm of space activity, some space insurance companies provide
third-party coverage, but as discussed above, it could be expensive and difficult to procure, thus
prohibiting further development of the space industry, and perhaps even hindering what could be
innovative technology to help manage space traffic.248 It is the developing area of third-party
liability insurance and issues such as those discussed above with regard to certain space
insurance policy exclusions; potential barriers to expensive “manuscripted” policies that do carry
third-party coverage; developing countries or newspace startups that may desire (if not need)
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access to the space infrastructure, namely those working with SmallSats or limited STM-related
technological capability and/or resources that serve as the reasons to explore other methods of
allocating risk and/or liability between space actors. In other words, the NSS argues “P&I space
clubs could likewise provide indemnification for risks, which traditional space insurers will not
handle.”249 Thus, it can be argued that pooled risks for which a P&I-club could provide
indemnification and/or coverage would benefit spacecraft owner/operators similarly to a
maritime actor. A potential space P&I club is discussed in further detail below.
In examining maritime P&I clubs from a financial perspective, the question of whether
the benefits of being a P&I club member outweigh the cost can be examined. According to The
American Club’s 2020 annual statement, the “[g]ross Members’ claims paid in FY2020
amounted to $73,649,000, with $59,000 in recoveries from the international P&I group
reinsurance, $12,586,000 in recoveries from the international P&I club pool, and $18,559,000 in
recoveries from other reinsurers, for a total of $59,051,000 for net claims paid.” 250 For the
Club’s FY2020 renewal, there were “no standardized, or general, increase applied to expiring
entries;” instead, The American Club implemented “more Member-specific approach… given
the varying risk profiles of different cohorts of The American Club’s membership, the majority
of which enjoyed sustainable levels of rating and conditions of insurance.” 251 If we continue to
use the 244-gt tug boat example and $5.33/gt average annual call value, an approximate cost of
an annual P&I call would be $1,300.52 for the subject 95-foot tug. Thus, despite actual financial
details not being readily available, it can be argued that in the maritime industry, the benefits of
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P&I club membership are likely worth the cost if the cost is such a significant fraction of a
maritime insurance policy.
The American Club breaks down further details of tonnage by vessel type. Its FY2020
member tonnage is as follows: “8% tonnage general cargo/container/passenger/RoRo [(“rollon/roll-off,” or ships that carry wheeled cargo)], 22% tankers, 25% tugs/barges/small craft, and
45% bulk carriers.” 252 We can see The American Club provides coverage to a very broad
spectrum of marine craft, both in size and what they carry.
The Shipowners’ Club based in London states it “offers a special welcome to shipowners
and charterers of all kinds from every part of the world… from the broadest spectrum of the
shipping industry,” and “[i]t is not dominated by, or restricted to, any particular industry sector
or interests 253 Further, the Shipowners’ Club insures “over 34,000 small and specialist vessels
across the globe,” including craft similar for which The American Club provides cover, but
additionally specifically calls out “dive, fishing, harbour, offshore, passenger/tour boat… and
yacht” as types of vessels, thus highlighting the details of the broad range of craft that can
acquire P&I cover.254 The Shipowners’ Club has “over 6,500 Members operating over 32,000
vessels at a total of 23,579,295 GT, delivered through a network of nearly 700 brokers.255
Though potential lack of homogeneity has been discussed as a potential downside to P&I
club membership, it could also be argued that the coverage available for a broad spectrum of
vessel types is actually a benefit of P&I club membership in that the more members covered, the
more self-monitoring and risk-pooling occurs, which could, in turn, lead to better behavior on the
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seas. Additionally, if a P&I club call is, in fact, significantly less expensive than a traditional
insurance policy, P&I club membership could be appealing to more shipowners, widening the
view of self-monitoring. This combined with the additional benefits of legal assistance and
emergency help if needed, the argument that P&I club membership benefits outweigh the cost is
reinforced. With the above information, we can begin to form a simulation of what a potential
space P&I club might look like.
Potential Space P&I Club
To examine the sub-question of whether liability apportionment and risk-pooling are
benefits to members of a potential space P&I club, as in the case of the maritime industry, some
background regarding potential incident coverage is examined herein.
Coverage
According to The American Club’s website, outside traditional hull and machinery
coverage provided under a conventional maritime insurance policy, some of the main risks is
covers are liabilities, expenses, and costs for the following:
•

Collision

•

Damage to docks, buoys and other fixed and floating objects

•

Wreck removal

•

Pollution

•

Fines and penalties

•

Vessel Diversion Expenses256
Some of the liabilities that may not be covered by a P&I club are as follows:

•

Ad valorem bill of lading
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•

Deviation

•

Delivery of cargo to a port other than the port specified in the bill of lading

•

Failure to arrive or late arrival at a port of loading

•

Delivery of cargo without production of bill of lading

•

Ante-dated or post-dated bill of lading

•

Clean bills of lading in case of damaged cargo

•

Deck cargo carried on terms of an under-deck bill of lading

•

Arrest or detention of an entered ship257

Though not all of the above coverages and exclusions do not perfectly parallel a space analogue,
some similarities can be drawn such as collision, wreck removal, and pollution. Except for oil
pollution, for which there are limitations of liability set, the above P&I exclusions may not relate
directly to space activity, and further research is warranted regarding specific potential space
liabilities for which a space P&I club may not provide cover. Specific examples of potential
incidents pertaining to spacecraft are discussed below, and, subsequently, how a potential space
P&I club membership could provide benefit to its members in response to those incidents.
For further background, as discussed above, Kunstadter believes for P&I clubs to
function, there needs to be some sort of homogeneity. It could be very difficult for a P&I club to
determine who might be “eligible” to be a member due to widely differing sizes, functions, and
orbits of various spacecraft.258 Thornton does not agree necessarily with the fact that
homogeneity needs to be a requirement for a P&I club membership – the main concerns are at
the poles where things get “backed up,” and he believes there could be some apportionment
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between larger and smaller operators.259 As exhibited in the list of types of vessels covered by
The American Club and The Shipowners’ Club, we can see if there is some sort of homogeneity,
it is not made clear through publicly available information at this time. Thus, a parallel is drawn
and a space P&I club will be assumed to cover a similar broad spectrum of craft.
Space Traffic and Potential Problems and Threats
Incidents on the Earth’s Surface
In January 1978, a Russian satellite, Cosmos 954, crashed in Canada leaving a wide
swath of radioactive waste in its wake. In 1978, Soviet satellite Cosmos 954 crashed in
Canadian territory, and spread radioactive debris over a large area.260 The incident was the “first
instance in the history of space exploration where a claim was made by one sovereign state
against another on account of damage caused by a falling space object,” and to date, has been the
only incident of this nature.261
The cleanup effort cost Canada “nearly fourteen million dollars, of which only
$6,041,174.70 was claimed,” that being costs “over and above what it would have had to pay for
personnel and equipment used in the operation in any event.” 262 In 1979, Canada made its
formal legal claim against the Soviet Union, and subsequently, “a three million dollar settlement
which did not expressly acknowledge [the USSR’s] legal liability was concluded in Moscow in
1981. An examination of potential third party liability coverage under a space P&I club is
examined in the space pollution section of this paper.
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Using Cosmos 954 as a very rough analogue, the effect of P&I’s coverage is examined
pertaining to liability, cost, and insurance coverage (if any is available) of an incident in which a
deorbiting spacecraft, similar to the derelict Chinese rocket body that landed in the Indian Ocean
last year, spread pollution over a swath of land, if such an incident were to happen today. For the
purposes of this study, it will be assumed that the pollution spread will not be radioactive in
nature, as further details regarding how a P&I club would handle radioactive waste warrant
further research. Instead, this study uses MARPOL’s Annex II pertaining to noxious liquids as
an analogue for the nature of the pollution spread, and assumes there is a potential for release of
noxious liquid, even if a small amount, in residual fuel within a rocket body. It will also be
assumed that a commercial spacecraft registered to the US would land somewhere in the US so
as not to trigger the insurance provisions in the CSLA.
Thornton states if a company owns a spacecraft and lets it fall into reentry, that company
would be subject to third party liability. 263 Thornton believes an aviation liability policy would
cover damage caused on land in the US by a US spacecraft, but, of course, it would be subject to
the limitations of that particular policy.264 As Harrington states, third party coverage can be
costly and complicated, and as stated above, a typical conventional space insurance policy does
not cover third-party liability. In this instance, the US spacecraft owner/operator and the harmed
party or parties would work to settle or go to court.
In terms of how a space P&I club would handle the situation, Thornton believes this
would be tough – if the incident is truly an accident, if a spacecraft malfunctions and lands
randomly, that could be covered with liability insurance. If an owner/operator had the ability to
control reentry but did not, that is intentional malfeasance, and it would fall under a
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willful/intentional acts exclusion of a policy, and may lead to potential criminal charges. But if it
was truly an accident, Thornton believes a third-party policy could cover it, but the question
arises of how the accident happened. Similarly, if one were to get into a car accident, and the
accident could have been avoided, the auto insurance policy would cover that, so how these
mechanisms could work similarly is a question for further study.”265
A question also arises of the extent of damage that could be caused to the Earth’s surface
and how that damage be assessed. Thornton believes damage would be assessed in the same
way the EPA measures risk and assesses damage by looking for pollutants and contaminants but
would otherwise be a relatively simple debris cleanup.266 For example, if the deorbiting craft
were to hit a building, the building would need to be rebuilt, and third-party liability insurance
would cover that. If the craft caused damage to a farm, the farmer would need to be paid for
those crops, and third-party liability insurance would cover that.
According to Ray Williamson, the then-executive director of the Secure World
Foundation, in a 2011 interview, “the stated… reason for destroying [the USA-193 satellite] with
a missile was that the satellite had large amounts of what was, by that time, solid hydrazine, and
“[i]f that fell in a populated area, or even in an unpopulated area, it would be dangerous to people
because it's highly toxic.”267 Thus, it could be argued that MARPOL Annex II is a good
analogue for potential noxious pollution. MARPOL is discussed in further detail below.
Thornton is not exactly sure of the mechanism of how third-party insurance would cover
this “contamination,” but as Harrington states, this third-party insurance could be costly and
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complicated, thus not accessible to many space actors.268 Even then, would the insurance
actually cover the accident, or would there be an exclusion embedded into the policy?
Space P&I club cover could be invoked here, as according to The American Club,
pollution is one of the liabilities that would be covered as part of membership. If the spacecraft
that causes damage is a large conventional satellite belonging to a large and established
company, that company might have a third-party liability policy in place which would cover
liability from pollution and/or contamination. However, if the spacecraft that causes damage is a
small satellite belonging to a small business or startup, and that small business was cognizant of
the fact that it should incorporate technology to adhere to STM policies and guidelines and
incorporated a propulsion system on-board to deorbit it accordingly, and that propulsion system
carried some type of noxious substance, and that spacecraft were to tumble out of orbit and leave
a toxic substance on land, what is the likelihood that small business could carry a traditional
third-party space insurance policy that could cover this type of pollution?
In another incident, on April 1, 2018, China’s Tiangong-1 space station deorbited and
disintegrated over the South Pacific,269 approximately 860km northeast of Samoa.270 There were
no reports of impact, but other instances of deorbiting space objects crash landing, striking
property and even people on Earth have occurred. In May 2021, a tumbling Chinese rocket body
reentered Earth’s atmosphere and landed in the Indian Ocean near Maldives, but drew “U.S.
criticism over lack of transparency.”271 Most of the Earth's surface is covered by water, so the
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likelihood that the rocket body would land in a populated area was low, with the “likelihood of
injuries even lower, according to experts.”272
However, “uncertainty over the rocket's orbital decay and China's failure to issue stronger
reassurances in the run-up to the re-entry fuelled [sic] anxiety.”273 According to Harvard-based
astrophysicist Jonathan McDowell, “[s]ince large chunks of the NASA space station Skylab fell
from orbit in July 1979 and landed in Australia, most countries have sought to avoid such
uncontrolled re-entries through their spacecraft design,” which is partly why the incident drew
heavy criticism.274 Again, no harm or damage resulting from this incident was reported, but the
chance remains that such an event could cause harm in the future.
Though the risk of debris hitting an actual person is extremely low, in January 1997,
Lottie Williams was walking in a park in Tulsa, Oklahoma with a friend when they “saw a huge
fireball streaking from the skies;” less than thirty minutes later, Ms. Williams felt something
touch her shoulder, and found something that hit the ground behind her. Analysis indicated it
was part of a Delta II rocket that was launched in 1996.275 Fortunately, Ms. Williams was not
injured in the incident, but it serves as an example of what could happen as a result of falling
debris that survives entering the Earth’s atmosphere.
In the examples above, if such incidents were to happen in the future, a potential space
P&I club could, indeed, provide a benefit to club members. Based on the fact that incidents
involving pollution are covered according to The American Club, coverage could be provided to
spacecraft owner/operators in the event of such an incident. It should be noted, however, that the
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nature of each club member’s specific agreement that some limitations or exclusions may apply,
and certain types of pollution, such as radiation, should be researched further. But especially if
previously referenced legal assistance and emergency help are part of P&I club membership, it
could be argued that potential space P&I club membership would benefit members in the event
of pollution.
Incidents On-orbit
Greater accessibility to outer space is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it allows
developing nations, small businesses, and educational entities to conduct research and
technological demonstrations, and to potentially provide services such as navigation and
communications capability at a much lower cost than current services. However, there has been
a “sudden and rapid increase in the launch rate of small satellites,” and according to Pardini and
Anselmo, “[b]etween the beginning of 2014 and the beginning of 2020… the total mass of the
artificial objects in orbit around the Earth has grown by approximately 22%, but the number of
operational spacecraft has more than doubled.”276 Further, based on the number of applications
filed by satellite operators, more than 100,000 new spacecraft are projected to be launched into
orbit by 2030.277
As noted in the US ODMSP section of this paper, constellations are a concern because
most of their activity occurs in LEO where there is growing presence and the potential for
“crowding.” Perhaps one of the most well-known satellite constellations in process of being
launched is SpaceX’s Starlink. As just one example highlighting the level of this concern, in
February 2022, NASA and the NSF submitted letters to the FCC in its “proceedings on SpaceX’s
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proposal for its Starlink “Gen 2” system with approximately 30,000 satellites in LEO.”278 Due to
the magnitude of the proposed constellation, the number of tracked objects in LEO would
increase by “more than a factor of five.”279 This is especially concerning to NASA because of its
upcoming crewed missions (of note, debris was a concern of SpaceX’s own Inspiration 4 crew as
they launched to and reentered from orbit).280 Specifically, NASA “‘recommends SpaceX
generate analysis demonstrating the auto-maneuver capability is sufficiently scalable to the entire
proposed constellation size, including inter-constellation conjunctions,” questioning whether
SpaceX’s automated collision avoidance system for its current constellation is capable of scaling
to the larger constellation.281
In December 2021, China filed a “note” with the UN stating it had to move its Tianhe
space station twice “to avoid SpaceX Starlink internet satellites,” both incidents “occurring when
astronauts were aboard the module.”282 The “note” was serious enough in tone to invoke Art. IX
of the OST.283 Of note, well-known astrophysicist, Jonathan McDowell, “confirmed that the
close encounters… did indeed take place,” and “posted a graph on Twitter showing that Tianhe
and a Starlink satellite were separated by just 1.9 miles (3 km) or so on Oct. 21.”284 However, as
noted previously, industry experts have stated that even spacecraft that pass each other at a
distance of one mile can still be considered a far enough distance to not pose a high risk of
collision.
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As previously stated, approximately 81% of the 25,666 known, tracked artificial objects
orbiting the Earth are non-functional spacecraft.285 As a result, the vast majority of spacecraft in
orbit is comprised of objects that are not actively providing service, and satellite operators are
required to remain diligent in ensuring their craft are able to maneuver around satellites that are
no longer in operation. As spacecraft fleets age and become nearer to EOL, commercial
telecommunications satellite operators may face potential gaps in service from satellite failure or
fuel depletion. For example, defunct satellites in GEO are taking up valuable orbital “slots,” as
satellites that may otherwise be ready for operation are prohibited from entering a designated
GEO position because a non-functional satellite is “taking up its real estate.”
Orbital debris can come from several sources. One is “mission-related debris and rocket
bodies that remain in orbit together.”286 The Aerospace Corporation defines “mission-related
debris” as “all objects dispensed, separated, or released as part of the planned mission,” such as
“separation bolts, lens caps, momentum flywheels, nuclear reactor cores, clamp bands, auxiliary
motors, launch vehicle fairings, and adapter shrouds.”287 These discarded items remain in orbit
after serving their purposes to their respective missions.
The largest source of space debris is fragmentation of satellites and rocket bodies.288,289
Most of this fragmentation occurs as a result of explosions due to residual fuel or other reactive
chemicals in engines or tanks, propellant tanks or batteries being heated by the sun, or
micrometeoroid strikes.290,291 Percy and Landrum state “[i]t is estimated that 70% of all
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fragmentations are caused by explosions.”292 A recent example occurred in August 2017 when
Indonesian satellite operator PT Telkom’s Telkom-1 satellite experienced an event that appeared
to be some sort of “rupture” that resulted in the generation of a cloud of debris . ExoAnalytic, a
commercial space situational awareness (SSA) company located in Mission Viejo, California,
recorded the event, and CEO Doug Hendrix said, “preliminary data shows Telkom-1 did not
collide with another object,” indicating the rupture possibly occurred due to an explosion.293
Fragmentation can also occur as a result of collisions between spacecraft. In 2009, a
collision occurred between one of United States communication company Iridium’s satellites
(Iridium 33) and a defunct Russian military satellite (Cosmos 2251) in LEO. Like the FY-1C
ASAT mission, the collision resulted in a massive debris cloud, and was estimated to have
created hundreds of thousands of pieces of small debris, and approximately 3,273 pieces of large
debris.294 While The Aerospace Corporation’s Debris Analysis Response Team (DART) found
that much of the resulting debris from the Iridium burned up as it entered the Earth’s atmosphere,
it is estimated that 48% remains in orbit.295 Percy and Landrum state only 2% of fragmentation
events occur due to collisions between “orbiting objects.”296
We have not yet determined the best way to clean up space debris, but, for now, we can
at least act in ways that will not unnecessarily create additional risk of damage in space.
Discussing ASAT activity from a policy perspective, the OST holds States responsible for their
actions. Article VI of the OST states “[p]arties to the Treaty shall bear international
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responsibility for national activities in outer space... and for assuring that national activities are
carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.”297 Article XI
prohibits “harmful interference” with other States’ peaceful space activity, and requires a State to
engage in consultation with other States if there is reason to believe a certain space activity may
create such harmful interference.298
In 2007, China successfully destroyed an “aging, but functioning Chinese weather
satellite, the Feng Yun 1C (FY-1C), in polar orbit at an altitude of approximately 537 miles”299
in an anti-satellite (ASAT) test mission, creating thousands of pieces of space debris that will
remain in orbit for decades.300 ASAT activity such as China’s FY-1C activity had not been
performed since the Cold War era by the United States and the Soviet Union.301 At their time of
writing, Percy and Landrum approximated that 28% of fragmentation events in orbit had been
deliberate.302 China’s ASAT activity in terms of liability will be discussed later in this paper, but
in terms of violating international law, based on Articles VI and IX of the OST, in and of itself, a
State firing a missile at its own satellite is not inherently an internationally wrongful act. It could
be argued that such an act violates the “peaceful purposes” requirement in Article IV of the
OST.303 However, destroying a State’s own defunct satellite in this fashion is not a placement of
weapons of mass destruction, nor is it an establishment of any type of military base.304 It is not
an aggressive act toward another State, and, provided the act is in accordance with Article IX and
proper measures are taken, ASAT missions directed at one’s own satellite are not internationally
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wrongful acts. But China did not announce its measure before launching its ASAT missile, nor
did it initiate consultation for what may have been a harmful space activity as is required in
Article IX of the OST,305 which is interesting to this author due to the fact that, as stated
previously, China essentially invoked Art. IX of the OST in its “note” to the UN. Thus, China
was in violation of the OST when it conducted its 2007 ASAT activity.
In light of the aforementioned orbital debris problem, we examine several legal questions
raised by China’s ASAT activity. Can China be held responsible for its ASAT missile launch
act? According to Article VI of the OST, and scholarly and legal interpretation, the answer to
this question is yes.306 Should China bear international responsibility for creating a mass cloud
of space debris and failing to conduct international consultations before their missile launch?
According to the test set forth in Article VI307 and Article IX308 of the OST, China should be held
responsible for these specific acts. Pursuant to Art. VII of the OST, what reparations to the
international community would be possible and/or needed? According to the Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,309 reparation is warranted. Article 31
states, “[t]he responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused
by the internationally wrongful act,” and that “[i]njury includes any damage, whether material or
moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State.”310 Forms of reparation depend on
the nature of the damage, if any, to the injured State(s), but, at the very least, the offending State
should issue “official apologies,” if there is no material damage.311 Is firing a missile at one’s
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own satellite an internationally wrongful act? As we see in the example of USA-193, with due
diligence and fulfillment of obligations under the OST and international law, the act of ASAT
activity against a State’s own satellite is not inherently a wrongful act.312
As noted above, Article VI of the OST states Parties to the Treaty are responsible for
their activity in space.313 Frans G. von der Dunk explains:
State responsibility, first, means responsibility for ‘internationally wrongful acts’
towards another state. The two decisive criteria for state responsibility to arise are
therefore that ‘a breach of an international obligation of the [responsible] State’ in
respect of the second state has taken place, which is called ‘objective fault’, and
that that breach ‘is attributable to the [responsible] State under international
law’.”314
Further, McDougal, et al. list some important factors for determining State responsibility,
such as the “extent and the degree of harm... [t]he purpose of the activity giving rise to
pollution,” the duration of harmful consequences, and, perhaps most notably, “[t]he kind of
advance warning or notice of danger given.”315 Parties to the OST are “hooked” by its Article VI
and are bound to bear responsibility for their actions in space; further examination seems to
make it clear that there are several other factors or “tests” that each State’s ASAT missions
“pass,” and holding each State responsible is justified.
Advance warning or notice of danger is noted as an important factor in determining
responsibility, as it was a key issue in whether China violated Article IX of the OST by not
engaging in consultations with other States prior to its FY-1C mission. In response to the
question of whether China should be held responsible for failing to conduct international
consultations as well as creating a cloud of potentially harmful space debris: yes. Michael
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Miniero parses out Article IX and explains that for a State to be obligated to initiate international
consultation, three conditions must be satisfied: 1) State activity in outer space; 2) reason to
believe the activity could cause harmful interference; and 3) that the potential harmful
interference may interfere with other States’ space activity316. China’s FY-1C mission,
according to Miniero, passes this test; thus, should be held responsible for not initiating
international consultations.
ASAT Activity Reparations.
Bin Cheng explains a State “may not even take the trouble” of raising the issue of
reparations if no material damage has occurred to a State potentially affected by harmful
activity,317 but von der Dunk states, “[u]nlawful action against non-material interests must
receive adequate reparation, even if they have not resulted in... material loss for the claiming
state.”318 Article 31 of the United Nations’ Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful
acts states a “responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury
caused by the internationally wrongful act,” and that injury “includes any damage... caused by
the internationally wrongful act of a State.”319
Forms of reparation include restitution (or returning to the state that existed before the
harmful activity), compensation if the damage “is not made good by restitution” (or financial
reimbursement for damage caused), and satisfaction if the damage “cannot be made good by
restitution or compensation” (potentially including “an acknowledgement of the breach, an
expression of regret, a formal apology”).320 In other words, the order in which reparations
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should take place is: 1) “cleaning up” the situation, 2) monetary or financial compensation if
another State has been materially harmed, and 3) an acknowledgment or apology if mitigation
and financial compensation are overly burdensome.
In 2013, debris from the remnants of FY-1C caused damage to another spacecraft –
apparently enough damage to destroy it. The FY-1C debris collided with a Russian nanosat,
“Ball Lens In The Space,” or BLITS, likely on January 22, 2013.321 Russia could have brought
legal action against China pursuant to the Liability Convention, but Russia “‘would have to show
that China was negligent in producing the fragment that struck BLITS and that there was no way
that the Russian Federation could have avoided the collision.’”322 The matter could have
potentially been dealt with via settlement negotiations, but due to the fact that BLITS was an
inexpensive nanosat, China and Russia had good diplomatic relations, and the burden of proof
would have been extremely difficult, Russia did not pursue any action.323 Of note, as of now, the
only precedent that exists for claims pursuant to the Liability Convention is in the case of
Cosmos 954, which will be discussed in the Land Pollution section of this paper.
On November 15, 2021, Russia conducted ASAT activity against one of its own
satellites, Cosmos 1408, that created a debris field in LEO. This activity is said to have created
“more than 1,500 pieces of debris large enough to be tracked by the U.S. Air Force, and
hundreds of thousands of smaller, untrackable pieces” that, as discussed previously, are
extremely problematic and could be devastating to missions and even life-threatening.324 The
debris is said to be creating “surges of close approaches,” or “conjunction squalls… in some

321

Leonard David, “Legal Action against China Unlikely in Orbital Debris Collision,” SpaceNews, March
13, 2013, https://spacenews.com/legal-action-against-china-unlikely-in-orbital-debris-collision/.
322
David, “Legal Action against China Unlikely,” March 13, 2013.
323
David, “Legal Action against China Unlikely,” March 13, 2013.
324
Michelle Hanlon, “A Date That Will Live in Infamy? Let’s Make it So,” NSS Ad Astra, Q4 2021
Volume 35, pg. 11.

77
cases tens of thousands in a week, with active satellites in low Earth orbit.”325 These squalls
“come from the interaction of the Cosmos 1408 debris with constellations of remote sensing
satellites,” and due to the nature of their respective orbits, “the debris overlaps the orbits of
remote sensing satellites — but going in the opposite direction,” and when the debris and remote
sensing satellites “sync up, you have the perfect storm: they’re in the same orbit plane but
counter rotating, crossing each other twice an orbit, again and again.”326
In a squall in early April, COMSPOC projects that conjunctions involving all active
satellites in LEO “will peak at nearly 50,000 per day,” including a baseline of “about 15,000
[conjunctions] per day not associated with the ASAT test, along with those involving Planet’s
satellites and with other companies and organizations, such as Satellogic, Spire and Swarm.”327
(See Charts and Graphs section of this paper for a graphic representation of these conjunctions.)
This author notes here Swarm’s picosats will be discussed in the Financial Study section of this
paper. Interestingly, “because many of those satellites are cubesats, the risk of collisions does
not rise as dramatically… the background average daily collision rate level [is] about 0.0005,
[and] during the surge in early April it reaches a peak of only a little more than 0.0008.”328 The
relatively low rise in risk of collisions because the number of satellites is significant but they are
small in size seems to counter what many experts consider a concern, but strikes a similar chord
to what some industry experts say about risk of collision overall.
However, this recent Russian ASAT activity created a hazard for astronauts on board the
ISS, who “were directed to take shelter in their docked spaceship capsules for two hours after the
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test as a precaution to allow for a quick getaway.”329 Ultimately, it was determined that the
astronauts could safely return to the ISS interior, but the debris cloud will linger and continue to
cause problems for other spacecraft, as discussed above.330 U.S. Army General James Dickinson
stated “‘Russia has demonstrated a deliberate disregard for the security, safety, stability and
long-term sustainability of the space domain for all nations,” which presages the concern for
national security assets in outer space. ASAT tests could present the perception that there is a
“simmering arms race in outer space,” and potentially “directly upset the delicate balance of nonaggression that exists” there, as such “weapons would also have offensive capabilities, inevitably
increasing the security dilemma in outer space and adding fuel to the arms race.”331
However, not many States have brought up security concerns outright, and most have
been more concerned with the generation of debris.332 The theoretical potential threat of ASAT
activity against another State’s spacecraft will be discussed later in this paper, but only within the
scope of an exclusion to a space insurance policy and potential cover provided by a potential
space P&I club. If a State conducted deliberate ASAT activity against another State’s satellite, it
would be a different scenario. If that activity was deemed an act of war, looking only within the
scope of liability and insurance coverage, it would be an exclusion from a conventional space
insurance policy. However, it could be covered by a potential space P&I club as it has been
stated to be part of a P&I club’s coverage to members.
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As in the example of incidents on the Earth’s surface, in the above examples, a potential
space P&I club could provide a benefit to club members. As The American Club coverage
includes collisions, wreck removal, and pollution, similar coverage could be provided to
spacecraft owner/operators in the event of incidents such as the above. Again, it should be noted
that each club member’s specific agreement will likely contain some limitations or exclusions
may apply. But as discussed above, especially if legal assistance and emergency help are part of
P&I club membership, it could be argued that potential space P&I club membership would
benefit members in the event of on-orbit incidents.
Space Infrastructure in Daily Life
Prior to discussing law, regulations, policies, and guidelines pertaining to STM, it is
important to examine why addressing matters of STM is crucial. What does this all matter to
society in general and how we perform seemingly ordinary functions every day? Satellites and
other spacecraft provide many benefits, often critical. They facilitate communication,
navigation, remote sensing, security and defense, and other services, the importance of which is
specifically addressed in the Space Sustainability Rating initiative discussed below, as it calls for
raising public awareness that keeping our space environment clean is critical.
Jah explains “given that our Geospace belongs to all humans and that many space actors
behave... without full consideration of the impact of their space operations and activities on the
whole environment... our Space Commons!” We are beginning to realize our access to space is
finite, and if the population of space objects continues to grow, we may run out of our resource
(in this case, access to and capability in space). Jah further highlights the fact that in 2016, the
Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) launched a record-breaking constellation of 104
satellites. Additionally, at the time of Jah’s testimony, satellite manufacturing company
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OneWeb had received FCC authorization to place over one thousand satellites into LEO with the
aim to provide global internet access, which has since become a reality. Jah noted at the time
that SpaceX was planning a similar mission and was working to follow suit with approximately
4,000 satellites, which has now become a reality.333
Hunter notes space capabilities “play a role in everything from buying gas to national
defense.” 334 If the number of objects in orbit around the Earth becomes too great, we risk losing
those capabilities to damage from collisions, or we may potentially not be able to launch
satellites in the future to continue services because there is too much risk of damage from
collisions with other craft – space would have simply become too crowded. Hunter notes further
that “[d]isruption in access to space-reliant services potentially range from minor inconveniences
to catastrophic global economic collapse.”335
According to the Satellite Industry Association, the global space economy in 2020 was
worth $371 billion, of which $271 billion (74%) was directly comprised of areas of the satellite
industry, including telecommunications satellite services (television, telephone, aviation, and
maritime), remote sensing services (agriculture, meteorology, and national security), and ground
equipment (network equipment, television and radio receivers, and navigation units).336
Financial damage to the global economy in the event of a catastrophic loss of space-based
capability is extremely serious, but the specific dollar values of consequential damages and loss
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of revenue in each industry that depends on space for its function is not explored in this paper
and is recommended for a point of future study. The social effects, however, are briefly
discussed here as follows.
A very recent and very significant example of benefits of spacecraft and use of spacerelated infrastructure is SpaceX’s provision of Starlink terminals to Ukraine when its
communications had been cut off after its invasion by Russia. Though it is (hopefully) not likely
a situation like this will arise in most of our daily lives, it is a dramatic example of how critical
communications capability is.
In a series of now-famous tweets between Mykhailo Fedorov, the First Prime Minister of
Ukraine, and SpaceX’s Elon Musk, a story publicly unfolded regarding Fedorov’s request that
SpaceX “provide Ukraine with Starlink stations.”337 Musk responded to Fedorov’s tweet
approximately ten hours later saying help was on the way.338 The request was made “to help
keep the embattled country connected to the outside world as Russia steps up its invasion.”339
Satellite capability also contributes to the shipping industry by improving navigation and
increasing the flow of data to keep seafaring vessels safe and moving efficiently. For example,
Spire Global offers Automatic Identification System (AIS) services through its satellite
constellation. Spire Global’s website explains AIS was developed for parties within the shipping
industry to exchange information with each other pertaining to “ship identity, position, time
course, and speed,” and can act as a traffic management tool.340 Most importantly, AIS would
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lead to safer shipping operations as sharing vessel positions could prevent a ship from running
aground or colliding with another ship.341
Additionally, Spire goes on to explain how AIS can reduce costs for shipping companies
and freight forwarders by providing more data on routes that could maximize a vessel’s fuel
usage, identify trends in the movement of commodities, and weather forecasts that could affect a
vessel’s estimated time of arrival into port, thereby streamlining the flow of supply chain
logistics.342 Subsequently, there would arguably be less time, labor, and fuel lost in inefficient
shipping activity, thereby resulting in cost savings.
According to OHB, a communications satellite company in Germany, financial
transaction data is transmitted globally several billion times per hour every day.343 This includes
simple transactions such as using a cell phone to pay a parking meter to making a stock trade
worth millions of dollars.344 Axess, another communications satellite company, with its main
offices in Germany, Mexico, Columbia, and Saudi Arabia, states satellite data transmission is
used to “complement… the terrestrial network infrastructure,” and can be used where
connectivity is limited or terrain is too rugged to install terrestrial networks while keeping
systems reliability high with greater than 99.6% uptime.345 Further, and perhaps most
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importantly, OHB and Axess state financial transactions via satellite are secure due to tracking of
users’ locations and signals being “used to check the plausibility of [the]transactions.”346,347
Financial transactions are not the only activity for which we need to be concerned about
security. John D. Hill told the HASC subcommittee on strategic forces that Secretary of Defense
Lloyd J. Austin III has also testified that the growth of Chinese and Russian counter space
capabilities presents the most immediate and serious threats to U.S. allied and partner space
activities. Additionally, ''Russia and China view space as critical to modern warfare and consider
the use of counterspace capabilities as both a means of reducing U.S. military effectiveness and
winning future wars,'' Hill said.348 Adm. Guiseppe Cavo Dragone, Italy’s defense chief of staff,
said it “‘will be essential to render the protection of satellites more robust’” and “warned of an
‘increase in threats’ and a ‘risk for security’ in space.”349 Of note, Cavo Dragone said watching
for threats in space is essential as “it would otherwise be difficult to distinguish between
‘irresponsible’ and ‘aggressive’ behavior… and to identify actors who provoke incidents in
orbit.”350 Further, response to a direct attack should be treated the same as an attack on a State’s
ship in international waters, and a State should respond accordingly.351 Especially in light of
“de-stabilizing challenges from Russia and… strategic competition with China,” this author
agrees with the fact that we must continue monitoring closely for potential intentional acts of
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aggression toward our satellites and other spacecraft, though such an act will hopefully never be
realized.352
In a constructive area of space activity, students from elementary schools through
universities can conduct educational and scholarly research and learn important lessons about
outer space. For example, the University of Georgia Small Satellite Research Laboratory
(SSRL) is working with NASA and the Air Force Research Laboratory to develop innovative
technology using CubeSats. The SSRL was originally developed “as an avenue for
undergraduates to design, build, and test space-ready components,” which has expanded over the
years.353 Also, in 2016, a CubeSat designed and built by St. Thomas More Cathedral School
students in Arlington, Virginia, in partnership with NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, was
deployed as a rideshare via Orbital ATK (now Northrop Grumman) Cygnus launch vehicle.354
The students’ STMSat1 would be used to take and transmit photographs of the Earth to the
school’s ground station as well as other ground stations in the US, and would facilitate hands-on
learning related to outer space activity.355
A 2011 MIT News Office article states after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, space entities
were tasked with “providing free images of the earthquake’s aftermath,” pursuant to an
international charter “under which satellite operators around the world offer to share satellite
data after a natural or man-made disaster.”356 The article goes on to state there are now countries
that are beginning to develop their own satellite programs to obtain their own information
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pertaining to their own States, namely in mapping and forecasting disasters, monitoring crop
yields, and tracking diseases such as malaria.357 Some of the nations that were beginning to
develop their programs at the time of the article’s publication included Nigeria, Malaysia,
Thailand, Turkey, and Algeria.358
Laws, Regulations, Policies, and Guidelines
This section will examine existing laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines pertaining to
STM, after which the question of whether policy adherence could be described as a benefit
stemming from potential space P&I club membership. A question arises about how we can
continue space operations on which our global society heavily relies when our space
environment is becoming so crowded with traffic. STM solutions are urgently needed.
International space treaties, policy, guidelines, and legislation are in place that provide
information on best practices to prevent further accumulation of orbital debris, and several
stakeholders in government and commercial industry are working to collect and distribute space
traffic status and conjunction notifications as well as develop ADR and OOS techniques.
As far as a clean and concise STM regime, however, a system of governance does not yet
exist – not domestically here in the US, let alone globally. Many actors are working toward the
one goal of ensuring we do not lose our access to space due to a dangerous cluttered orbit but are
doing so through their own avenues. One dedicated comprehensive global “hub” for STM
matters does not yet exist. The fragmentation of STM efforts could create a problem due to the
fact that they could conflict and “get in each other’s way” despite aspiring to the same goal of
creating a safe and sustainable space environment. But the efforts could also be seen as part of
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the archive of best practices on which we can build best practices for risk management and
STM.359
If we were to proceed with a “one-stop shop” for STM governance, one potential solution
may be the drafting of a new international treaty dedicated to addressing STM, ADR, and
OOS.360 However, especially in this current political climate at the time of this writing, it is
extremely unlikely that spacefaring States would be willing to sign on to a new treaty, and
domestic (national) legislation would be the most efficient solution to address STM matters at
present, especially due to their urgent nature.361
Another solution might be the creation of a new international organization, also
specifically dedicated to addressing STM, OOS, and ADR matters. 362 A space actor could
voluntarily transfer the right of jurisdiction and control of its craft to this organization, which
could then maintain registration of that craft and provide ADR and OOS to it. 363 The
organization would have cross-waivers in place if an incident occurred during said ADR or OOS,
and the parties to the agreement could work among themselves to settle a claim. 364
A third possible solution would be for an international organization to draft standards for
STM practices and to help create a sustainable space environment, such as ISO.365 It would be in
a commercial company’s best interest to adhere to these standards to earn “good marks” and
place itself as high in competition with other companies in the industry366 Further, such trade
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organizations have also had positive impact on airlines’ behavior, much like a P&I club or
conventions such as MARPOL (discussed below) have had positive impact on shipping
owner/operators’ behavior in the maritime industry. 367 Thus, it could be argued a similar spacerelated international organization could also have positive impact on spacecraft owner/operators’
behavior on-orbit.368 A similar organization or set of standards has been in the works for over
two years, stemming from the World Economic Forum, in the form of the Space Sustainability
Rating, which is discussed below.
A fourth potential solution for STM issues is using insurance policies as contracts, thus
forming a quasi-system of governance.369 Essentially, parties to an insurance policy (contract)
would be enforced to operate in a certain way pursuant to that contract, which could incentivize
good behavior or disincentivize bad behavior.370 As discussed above, incentivization is a key
part of this research regarding how P&I clubs could provide said incentive to commercial
spacecraft owner/operators where there may be gaps in traditional insurance. The fact that an
insurance contract could, in part, govern how space entities operate in tandem with P&I club
coverage that would theoretically fill in third-party liability gaps arguably provides a
comprehensive foundation for best STM practices.
Relevant International Treaties and Conventions
Outer Space Treaty
Certain Articles of the OST carry significant importance pertaining to STM. Article VI
of the OST holds States responsible for their actions: “[p]arties to the Treaty shall bear
international responsibility for national activities in outer space… and for assuring that national
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activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.”371
Article VIII states an object on a State’s registry shall remain under the jurisdiction and
ownership of that State, 372 and Article IX prohibits “harmful interference” with other States’
peaceful space activity, and requires a State to engage in consultation with other States if there is
reason to believe a certain space activity may create such harmful interference.373 While “the
space community expects a general decline in the number of intentional fragmentation events
due to increased pressure to avoid the creation of orbital debris,”374 compliance with the OST
cannot be assumed. For example, in the case of the FY-1C ASAT mission, it could be argued
that China was in violation of Art. IX because a) there was reason to believe its ASAT activity,
though conducted against its own space object, could potentially create harmful interference to
other States’ spacecraft, and b) it did not engage in consultations before proceeding with its
potentially harmful activity.
In the case of orbital debris, if a State does not comply with the OST, and engages in
potentially harmful activity that puts other States’ space capabilities as risk, what remedies are
available, if any? Frans G. von der Dunk states, “[u]nlawful action against non-material interests
must receive adequate reparation, even if they have not resulted in… material loss for the
claiming state.”375 Article 31 of the United Nations’ Responsibility of States for internationally
wrongful acts states a “responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the
injury caused by the internationally wrongful act,” and that injury “includes any damage…
caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State.”376
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Forms of reparation include restitution (or returning to the state that existed before the
harmful activity), compensation if the damage “is not made good by restitution” (or financial
reimbursement for damage caused), and satisfaction if the damage “cannot be made good by
restitution or compensation” (potentially including “an acknowledgement of the breach, an
expression of regret, a formal apology”).377 In other words, the order in which reparations
should take place is: 1) “cleaning up” the situation, 2) monetary or financial compensation if
another State has been materially harmed, and 3) an acknowledgment or apology if mitigation
and financial compensation are overly burdensome.
Art. VII is also key when discussing liability in outer space, especially as we examine the
CSLA, as it sets forth international requirements for liability between States. It is important to
note Art. VII is tied to Arts. VI and VIII in that a Party to the Treaty that launches a space object,
whether that State owns the object or the object is simply launched from a State’s territory, is
internationally liable for damage to another Party to the Treaty including its “natural or juridical
persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air or in outer space… .”378 In the
CSLA section of this paper, how US legislation addresses liability and insurance pertaining to
damage to another State/Party to the Treaty will be examined further.
Registration Convention
Art. II of the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space
(Registration Convention) requires a State that launches a space object to “register the space
object by means of an entry in an appropriate registry which it shall maintain,” 379 and Art. III
requires the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) to maintain its own registry from the
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information provided by the launching States.380 Art. VI states if an unregistered space object
causes damage to a spacecraft under the ownership of a State Party,
other States Parties, including in particular States possessing space monitoring
and tracking facilities, shall respond to the greatest extent feasible to a request by
that State Party… for assistance under equitable and reasonable conditions in the
identification of the object. 381
Thus, an outside State Party with space object tracking capability must provide
information to the damaged State Party (within feasibility and reason) to try and determine who
owns the object that caused the damage, and, in turn, who could be responsible and/or liable
under the OST and the Liability Convention. As discussed below, determining ownership of the
object in question and, in turn, deeming responsibility and/or liability could be an extremely
difficult, if not impossible, endeavor.
Liability Convention
In his article “A Sleeping Beauty Awakens,” (title abbreviated), Von der Dunk states
“The Liability Convention considered the possibility that something might go horribly wrong in
space, and further considered the monetary retribution that might result.”382 He describes it
further in his work “Liability versus Responsibility in Space Law,” noting liability is a very key
factor in space activity – so much so that “a special Liability Convention was devoted to develop
the provisions of Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty.”383
Art. III of the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects
(Liability Convention) states “
[i]n the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of the Earth
to a space object of one launching State or to persons or property on board such a
380
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space object by a space object of another launching State, the latter shall be liable
only if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is
responsible 384
According to Slann, this means that “in order to prove that a party can be deemed liable
for a collision between two space objects in outer space, the other would have to conclusively
establish that one of the launching states, or persons for whom it is responsible, is at fault.”385 In
other words, the burden of proof falls on the party that suffered the harm. It could be very
difficult, then, to prove without a doubt that a certain party’s spacecraft caused the damage
without identifying information, especially if that space object was not registered per
requirements of the Registration Convention.
The international space treaties set international laws pertaining to outer space activity,
but in terms of liability, ensuring adherence can become confusing and difficult, especially when
a State is Party to several (as in the case of the US). Especially when it comes to coming to a
final determination of whose space object caused harm, if this determination is not possible, what
is a harmed party’s action if no one is deemed liable? How are reparations made to them? This
question is further explored when looking at space insurance (within the scope of US commercial
space activity). First, however, another important international convention pertaining to
pollution of the seas is examined as it is deemed relevant to the maritime/outer space
environment analogue.
MARPOL
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, or MARPOL, is
“the main international convention covering prevention of pollution of the marine environment
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by ships from operational or accidental causes.”386 MARPOL “consists of six separate Annexes,
each set out regulations covering the various sources of ship-generated pollution.”387 We
particularly examine Annex II and Annex V herein.
Generally, it is said that MARPOL has led to innovations that have “contributed greatly
to a noticeable decrease in the pollution of the world’s seas, though it is fair to recognise that a
greater effort to impose compliance must be carried out.”388 This is particularly important as it
indicates a set of regulations could lead to actual positive impact in the space environment, as
well.
Annex II of MARPOL sets forth regulations pertaining to noxious liquid substances, or
carriage of chemicals in bulk.389 Annex II is a good analogue for space activity due to liquid fuel
carried by spacecraft. Annex II “sets out a pollution categorization system for noxious and liquid
substances” as follows:

•

Category X: Noxious Liquid Substances which, if discharged into the sea… present a
major hazard to either marine resources or human health (prohibited from being
discharged into marine environment);

•

Category Y: Noxious Liquid Substances which, if discharged into the sea… present a
hazard to… marine resources, human health, or cause harm to amenities or other
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legitimate uses of the sea (limitation on the quality and quantity of the discharge into the
marine environment);
•

Category Z: Noxious Liquid Substances which, if discharged into the sea… present a
minor hazard to either marine resources or human health (less stringent restrictions on the
quality and quantity of the discharge into the marine environment); and

•

Other Substances: substances which have been evaluated and found to fall outside
Category X, Y or Z because they are considered to present no harm to marine resources,
human health, amenities or other legitimate uses of the sea (are not subject to any
requirements of MARPOL Annex II.)390

There are several other more technical regulations set forth within Annex II, but as they are
technical in nature, they are beyond the scope of this paper. Despite this, we could draft a
similar categorization of pollutants from spacecraft that, in the event of a spill, have the potential
to create hazards on orbit or on the surface of the Earth. This potential categorization is
recommended for further research.
MARPOL Annex V addresses matters of garbage, and “generally prohibits the discharge
of all garbage into the sea,” (except certain provisions related to “food waste, cargo residues,
cleaning agents and additives and animal carcasses”) (please see Exhibit A for an overview of
the MARPOL Annex V discharge provisions).391 Generally, “cargo residues which contain
substances classified as harmful… must not be discharged at sea… .” 392 Further,
ships of 100 gross tonnage and above… must carry a garbage
management plan… which includes written procedures for
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minimizing… and disposing of garbage, including the use of the
equipment on board.393
Similar to Annex II, Annex V could be seen as an analogue for the space environment, even with
current rules, regulations, policies, and guidelines that exist today. For example, FCC
regulations that require a narrative of how an operator plans to mitigate debris from being
released from its spacecraft could arguably be considered a “garbage management plan,” of
sorts.
Other Relevant International Policies
IADC Guidelines
Internationally, IADC first issued its SDMG in December 2007 and revised them in
March 2020.394 It is important to note the SDMG contains much of the same content as the
United States’ Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (ODMSP) and other policies with
regard to guidelines and strategies, and much of that content has made its way into US FCC
satellite licensing requirements, discussed later in this paper.
The IADC consists of thirteen space agencies:
1) Italian Space Agency (ASI)
2) Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES)
3) China National Space Administration (CNSA)
4) Canadian Space Agency (CSA)
5) German Aerospace Center (DLR)
6) European Space Agency (ESA)
7) Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO)
8) Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA)
9) Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI)
10) National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
11) State Space Corporation (ROSCOSMOS)
12) State Space Agency of Ukraine (SSAU)
13) United Kingdom Space Agency (UKSA)
393
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The IADC’s purpose is to exchange information, facilitate cooperation, review ongoing
activities, and identify and recommend mitigation opportunities related to both “human-made
and natural” space debris. However, the SDMG specifically focuses on human-made debris.”395
In turn, the IADC provides guidance on debris mitigation strategies and space traffic measures
such as limiting debris release throughout normal operations, minimizing potential for on-orbit
breakups/destruction (including during and post-mission), and spacecraft disposal at EOL.
It is important to note the SDMG is one set of guidelines that recommends the “25-year”
rule for spacecraft in LEO; that the craft should be limited to a lifetime on orbit of 25 years and
then be deorbited or shepherded to a “graveyard orbit.”396 Additionally, the SDMG recommends
“developing the design and mission profile” of a spacecraft to mitigate and minimize probability
of “accidental collision with known objects” during the craft’s lifetime, including small debris,
and that which would “[prevent] post-mission disposal.”397
Thus, the SDMG not only aims to prevent spacecraft from causing debris by minimizing
the probability of itself breaking apart or causing additional debris by colliding with other
objects, but also to prevent the craft from “passively” becoming debris by not having the ability
to deorbit itself or park itself in a graveyard orbit. Subsequently, theoretically, the amount of
space traffic could be kept at a minimum and the “orbital lanes” could operate more cleanly with
less risk of bumping into each other (or, at least, the idea is that an attempt could be made in
good faith to do so).
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UN Guidelines for Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities
In June 2018, the UN COPUOS issued its Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of
Outer Space Activities.398 The document does not advise on technical data recommendations
pertaining to space traffic but provides a broad set of strategies that are not binding per
international law, but very strongly encouraged as they attempt to make very clear our space
environment needs to be kept clean for long-term usability. The UN Sustainability Guidelines
align with the OST and are “integrally associated” with it, and they also align with the other
policies and guidelines discussed in this paper.399
At a high level, the purpose of the UN Sustainability Guidelines is to encourage States to
create and implement strategies, such as putting regulatory frameworks in place (or revising
them appropriately as new STM data are gathered), to “ensure the effective application of
relevant, generally accepted international norms, standards and practices for the safe conduct of
outer space activities.” Further, these States’ regulations should not be drafted in such a way that
in the future, they could become a barrier to space activity that facilitates space environment
sustainability and should be “efficient in terms of limiting the cost for compliance (e.g., in terms
of money, time or risk)… .”400 The examination of implementing guidelines such as these UN
Sustainability Guidelines through the lens of a commercial space company and effects on cost,
business/risk management, and insurance/liability will be addressed later in this paper.
Guideline A.3 should be particularly noted as it is integrated with Art. VI of the OST.
Guideline A.3, itself, is titled “Supervise national space activities.”401 Essentially, this guideline
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invokes Art. VI in terms of States being responsible for activities of entities within its
jurisdiction, thus should ensure these entities conduct space activity that aligns with the UN
Sustainability Guidelines overall; that entities implement “technical competencies,” procedures,
and structures throughout the spacecraft’s entire life cycle that account for long-term space
sustainability.402
The UN Sustainability Guidelines could be broken out into four pillars: pre-launch,
gathering and sharing of orbital data, conjunction assessment during all phases of on-orbit life of
the spacecraft, and raising public awareness of the importance of space sustainability. With
regard to pre-launch requirements, the Guidelines recommend States “[d]evelop practical
approaches for pre-launch… assessment” and share that information to encourage further
research into long-term space sustainability. A pre-launch assessment of a manufacturer or
owner/operator’s spacecraft could consist of a review of “design approaches that increase the
trackability of space objects” and whether the entity “implement[s] applicable international and
national space debris mitigation standards and/or guidelines.403 Further, the UN Sustainability
Guidelines recognizes the importance of small objects in space activity, especially due to their
accessibility to developing and “emerging spacefaring” countries, and recommends
implementation of the Guidelines in launching and operating “small-size space objects that are
difficult to track, in a way that promotes the long-term sustainability of outer space activities.”404
With regard to space object tracking data, States should “promote techniques and the
investigation of new methods to improve such accuracy” and should coordinate both among
themselves and internationally to share and disseminate orbital debris data and “space debris
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monitoring information” to create a database.405 In concert with the pre-launch guidelines
pertaining to making spacecraft more trackable, this space object database would ideally become
as comprehensive as possible.
Presumably, with a comprehensive space object database at hand, the UN Sustainability
Guidelines would aid facilitation of “develop[ment] and implement[ation]” of appropriate
“approaches to and methods for conjunction assessment during all orbital phases of controlled
flight.”406 Although, gain invoking Art. VI of the OST, the Guidelines further advise “States
should encourage entities, including spacecraft operators and conjunction assessment service
providers under their jurisdiction and/or control to perform conjunction assessments through
national mechanisms, when applicable.”407 “National mechanisms” could be interpreted as via
regulatory oversight or use of a domestic space object database, but this matter will not be
discussed within the scope of this paper.
Additionally, the fact that the UN Sustainability Guidelines recognizes the importance of
raising awareness of the “important societal benefits of space activities and of the consequent
importance of enhancing the long-term sustainability of outer space activities” places an
emphasized note on how critical it is that we protect our space environment.408 Some of the
industries used in everyday life that rely on space infrastructure are examined and how
catastrophic a loss of space-based capability could be. Thus, the more the public understands the
cruciality of keeping our orbital environment clean, ideally, the more steps we would want to
take to protect it.
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An overarching point to be taken from the UN Sustainability Guidelines is the fact that it
encourages States to “[i]nvestigate and consider new measures to manage the space debris
population in the long term,” which could include extending operational lifetime of a spacecraft
(such as via OOS or Northrop Grumman’s Mission Extension Pods), novel techniques to prevent
collision with… debris” and other space objects, and “advanced measures” for post-mission
disposal” (such as with a dragsail or being shepherded to a graveyard orbit).409 Further, if a State
has greater “technical and other relevant capabilities” at its disposal, the “greater the emphasis
that State should place on implementing the guidelines to the extent feasible and practicable.”410
On the other hand, “States without such capabilities are encouraged to take steps to develop their
own capacity to implement the guidelines,” but are also encouraged to collaborate
internationally.411
Together, the UN Sustainability Guidelines are comprised of much content that makes up
long-existing treaties, policies, and guidelines, but they are certainly not irrelevant. Several of
these Guidelines, especially those regarding facilitating how SmallSats and developing entities
address space sustainability, make appearances in the US FCC satellite licensing regulatory
requirements, thus fulfilling Guideline A.3 and several other UN Sustainability Guidelines.
United States Law, Policy, and Licensing
United States Legislation
The subject of orbital debris is addressed in the United States Code: 51 U.S.C. § 31501
(2017) and in 2015’s Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (CSLCA). 51 U.S.C. §
31501 states “[t]he Administrator, in conjunction with the heads of other Federal agencies, shall
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take steps to develop or acquire technologies that will enable the Administration to decrease the
risks associated with orbital debris.”412 “The Administration” refers to NASA, and “[t]he
Administrator” refers to the Administrator of NASA.413 This language does not set forth specific
law pertaining to orbital debris mitigation or remediation techniques; only that NASA and other
agencies are required to take steps to enable NASA to decrease orbital debris risk. Other
agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), are not mentioned in this legislation, which was passed in December
2010.
However, the CSLCA directs NASA, along with the Secretary of Transportation, the
Chair of the FCC, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Defense to “enter into an
arrangement with an independent systems engineering and technical assistance organization to
study alternative frameworks for the management of space traffic and orbital activities.”414 To
be included in the study were assessments of best practices, current authorities, STM and orbital
debris requirements, existing assets and capabilities to conduct STM and SSA, risk associated
with SmallSat launches, existing private sector information sharing activities associated with
SSA and STM, and recommendations. 415
In 2016, the FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) issued its
mandatory report to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and
the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of the House of Representatives.416 The
findings were as follows: the FAA AST, with additional legislative authority, could provide SSA
412
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data and information to commercial, civil, and foreign entities when not inherently military in
nature; the information provided for would include, conjunction assessments, collision avoidance
support, and emergency close approach notifications; statutory authority would be required to
authorize a civil agency to release safety-related SSA data and information to any entity
consistent with the national security and public safety interests of the United States; the
Department of Defense (DOD) will continue to maintain capabilities, collect data, and maintain a
master object catalog as well as conduct any operations necessary to maintain national security;
and pursuant to the 2010 National Space Policy, all departments and agencies will share their
capabilities, specifically SSA data and expertise as available, to assist each other in the
accomplishment of the space safety mission. 417
If the FAA Report’s recommendations are authorized and put in place, they provide solid
groundwork in building solutions to the orbital debris issue. Currently, there are several U.S.
entities that are stakeholders in STM, including the DOD, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), NASA, the FCC, and the FAA.418 The development of one “storefront” as a source for all SSA/STM information would combine the interests of the stakeholders
and streamline the process for requesting data, thus making it easier for satellite owner/operators
to conduct avoidance maneuvers.
The “store-front” in concert with a more comprehensive debris tracking system, such as
Space Fence, would facilitate a better “warning system” for potential conjunctions, and would
enable the U.S. to fulfill its obligation to the OST in engaging in consultation regarding
avoidance maneuvers if there is potential for the activity to be “harmful.”
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Removing current SSA/STM operations away from 18 SCPS would relieve it of the
burden and allow it to resume focus on their national defense responsibilities. Additionally, the
DOD would maintain authority over national defense-related spacecraft so as not to jeopardize
national security. Such domestic framework could, according to Jah, allow the U.S. to “step up
as leaders and provide a meaningful solution for others to join and follow” in developing a more
comprehensive orbital debris management regime.419
Further, regarding ADR and OOS, international legal and political issues remain, but as
mentioned above, technological demonstrations of these remediation methods are already
occurring. Further research into domestic policy specifically pertaining to and licensing of
commercial ADR and OOS activity is recommended.
CSLA
In 1984, Congress enacted the CSLA “to promote economic growth and entrepreneurial
activity through use of the space environment for peaceful purposes.”420 The CSLA contains
requirements pertaining to liability, insurance, and cross-waivers between entities party to
launch/reentry activity. Specifically, an entity that has been granted a license to conduct
launch/reentry activity shall
obtain liability insurance or demonstrate financial responsibility in
amounts to compensate for the maximum probable loss from claims by—
(A) a third party for death, bodily injury, or property damage or loss
resulting from an activity carried out under the license; and
(B) the United States Government against a person for damage or loss
to Government property resulting from an activity carried out under the
license.421

Further, currently, “a licensee or transferee is not required to obtain insurance or
demonstrate financial responsibility of more than” $500,000,000 in the event of a claim from “a
419

Statement, 3.
51 USC, Commercial Space Launch Activities, 2010, § 50901.
421
51 USC, Commercial Space Launch Activities, 2010, § 50914 (a)(1).
420

103
third party for death, bodily injury, or property damage or loss resulting from an activity carried
out under the license,” and $100,000,000 in the event of a claim from “the United States
Government against a person for damage or loss to Government property resulting from an
activity carried out under the license.”422 Reciprocal waivers of claim, or “cross-waivers,” are
required between “applicable parties involved in launch services or reentry services under which
each party to the waiver” essentially indemnifies the other for “personal injury to, death of, or
property damage or loss sustained by it or its own employees resulting from an activity carried
out under the applicable license.”423
Further, the U.S. Government shall pay a successful claim “of a third party… resulting
from an activity carried out under the license issued or transferred under this chapter for death,
bodily injury, or property damage or loss” provided that the claim is either “(A) more than the
[required] amount of insurance or demonstration of financial responsibility,” or “(B) not more
than $1,500,000,000… above that insurance or financial responsibility amount,” plus any
additional amounts that account for inflation.”424
If the third party that sustained damage is a US-based spacecraft and the inflicting party
is also in the US, the parties would seek remedy in the US court system. This factor comes into
play in the discussion of third-party liability insurance discussed in the Space Insurance section
of this paper.
United States National Space Policy
The National Space Policy of the United States of America of 2010 (US Space Policy)
provides guidelines on minimizing space debris, including: leading continued development and
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adoption of international and industry standards to minimize debris; using SSA information to
identify space activity that is “contrary to responsible use and the long-term sustainability of the
space environment;” continuing to follow the US Government Orbital Debris Mitigation
Standards; pursuing development of technology to “mitigate and remove on-orbit debris, reduce
hazards, and increase understanding of the current and future debris environment,” as well as
work to foster development of space collision warning measures.425 In concert with the FAA’s
recommendations in its above-referenced report, these guidelines provide solid groundwork for a
domestic orbital debris solution. It should be noted that policy is not law, however, so further
research into methods for holding parties accountable for actions contrary to the preservation of
the space environment is recommended.
SPD3
While SPD3 lays a strong framework, as of the time of this writing, we have (arguably)
only just begun to pave a solid path toward a solution for managing space traffic – domestically
and globally. SPD3 sets forth nine goals to create “the conditions for a safe, stable, and
operationally sustainable space environment,” and direct the U.S. to continue to serve as a leader
in those endeavors. The nine goals are as follows:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)

425

Advance SSA and STM Science and Technology (“S&T”);
Mitigate the effect of orbital debris on space activities;
Encourage and facilitate U.S. commercial leadership in S&T, SSA, and STM;
Provide U.S. Government-supported basic SSA data and basic STM services to
the public;
Improve SSA data interoperability and enable greater SSA data sharing;
Develop STM standards and best practices;
Prevent unintentional radio frequency (“RF”) interference;
Improve the U.S. domestic space object registry; and
Develop policies and regulations for future U.S. orbital operations.426
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For ease of reference, each of the above goals may be categorized into one or more of the abovereferenced key areas of STM (mitigation of orbital debris and best practices to prevent it,
advancement of SSA, greater sharing of SSA data, monitoring and tracking of space objects, and
prevention of conjunctions and collisions). Additionally, SPD3 points to U.S. commercial
industry to help advance STM and SSA S&T, and charges the U.S. to continue its leadership in
these areas by developing and integrating policies, regulations, guidelines, and best practices,
and by providing examples to set the standard in global engagement with regard to STM.
The SPD3 Guidelines flow from the SPD3 Goals, and just as each Goal can be
categorized, each SPD3 Guideline can fall into a similar “bucket” accordingly. The SPD3
Guidelines are outlined as follows:
1) Managing the Integrity of the Space Operating Environment
a. Improving SSA coverage and accuracy
b. Establishing an Open Architecture SSA Data Repository
c. Mitigating Orbital Debris
2) Operating in a Congested Space Environment
a. Minimum Safety Standards and Best Practices
b. On-Orbit Collision Avoidance Support Service
3) Strategies for Space Traffic Management in a Global Context
a. Protocols to Prevent Orbital Conjunctions
b. Radio Frequency Spectrum and Interference Protection
c. Global Engagement
United States Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices
In the United States, alongside SPD3, the ODMSP (last updated November 2019)
provides exactly that: best practices for STM overall, but, as its name makes clear, mainly
addressing orbital debris. The revised ODMSP “includes improvements to the original
objectives as well as clarification and additional standard practices for certain classes of space
operations,” namely quantitative and probability limits on “debris released during normal
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operations… accidental explosions… and successful postmission disposal.”427 The ODMSP also
incorporates language for best practices for constellations, “rendezvous and proximity
operations, small satellites, [and] satellite servicing,” meaning the US Government is prepared, at
least within the scope of these guidelines, for OOS and other rendezvous activities to occur.428
The ODMSP consists of five objectives, a few of which have been incorporated by the
aforementioned 2019 revision: 1. control of debris released during normal operations; 2.
minimizing debris generated by accidental explosions; 3. selection of safe flight profile and
operational configuration; 4. postmission disposal of space structures; and 5. clarification and
additional standard practices for certain classes of space operations (including constellations,
CubeSats, and OOS).429
The ODMSP considers a “constellation consisting of 100 or more operational spacecraft
cumulative” a large constellation and should have a “probability of successful postmission
disposal at a level greater than 0.9 with a goal of 0.99 or better.”430 The preferred disposal
method for constellations is either direct reentry or placing the craft into a graveyard orbit.431
For small craft (SmallSats, CubeSats, etc.), the ODMSP states they should follow each of the
previous four objectives. Each of these classes of spacecraft should be subject to the “25-year
rule,” or “the limitation of how long a spacecraft may reside in LEO if there is a certain
probability it may collide with another large object,”432 which is currently 25 years. Further,
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there are several other technical guidelines set forth in the ODMSP, but as they are technical in
nature, they are considered beyond the scope of this paper.
SPD3, ODMSP, IADC SDMG, the UN Sustainability Guidelines, and USSP are intended
to work in concert to manage space traffic, mitigate risk of spacecraft conjunctions or collisions,
and plant the seed for future STM capabilities including OOS and ADR. As previously
mentioned, many of these practices and guidelines have found their way into US regulatory
requirements as in the case of the recently-amended FCC satellite licensing application process.
FCC Licensing Requirements for Launch of Spacecraft
The FCC requirements and application information to obtain a license operate a “space
station,” or satellite, on a frequency in the US are found in the US Code of Federal Regulations.
47 C.F.R. Subpart B sets forth application filing information, fees, and requirements for several
types of satellite licensing, including a newer streamlined small non-geostationary (NGSO)
satellite (“SmallSat”) and craft that travel beyond Earth orbit.433,434,435 Within the scope of this
paper, 47 C.F.R. § 25.114: Applications for space station authorizations is examined. 47 C.F.R.
§ 25.114 not only sets requirements to submit technical frequency band information, public
interest considerations, and broadcast operations information, but includes recently amended
paragraph (d)(14) concerning orbital debris mitigation requirements.436 The rule amendment,
“Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age,” became effective on September 24, 2020,
and contains a list of required information to be submitted with an entity’s application, including:
A narrative describing assessment and limitation of amount of debris released, both planned and
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unplanned; probability of becoming a source of or causing debris; the operator’s plans to avoid
collisions; passivation and depletion of residual fuel at EOL.437
Importantly, during the commenting period prior to issuing the rule amendment, a
discussion was had whether insurance should be one of the requirements to obtain an FCC
license to operate a satellite within the US.438 The FCC “sought comment on the utility of
insurance on its own as a means to incentivize operators to adhere to best practices in space,”
and, specifically, whether “the ability to obtain lower insurance premiums could provide an
economic incentive for operators to adopt debris mitigation strategies that reduce risk.”439 Based
on comments received, the FCC determined that insurance, alone, “generally would not
necessarily incentivize good behavior in space,” and suggests insurance does not, by itself,
“provide adequate incentives for debris mitigation,” and thus it “decline[d] to adopt an insurance
requirement on its own as a way of incentivizing ‘good behavior’ in space.440 In her research,
Harrington finds “[t]here exists a line of scholars in traditional insurance fields who argue
insurance should never be mandatory, on the basis that not everyone accepts the moral
assumptions of… responsibility for the well-being of others,” which seems to reinforce the
FCC’s findings and ultimate determination that insurance should not be part of the licensing
regulatory requirement.441
However, the FCC states they “seek comment in the Further Notice on whether a rule
regarding indemnification will help to ensure that liability is considered as operators make
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decisions concerning satellite design and operation,” which leads this author to believe such a
rule pertaining to indemnification and liability is, in fact, going to come to fruition, whether
specifically incorporating language regarding insurance or not.442
Other Policy Initiatives
Space Sustainability Rating
In 2018, the World Economic Forum launched an initiative in which four entities – ESA,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), University of Texas at Austin, and Bryce Space
and Technology – “formed a consortium to design a rating able to encourage behaviours that are
more responsible by promoting mission designs and operational concepts that are compatible
with a stable evolution of the environment.”443 The “Framework for the Space Sustainability
Rating” paper presented at the European Conference on Space Debris in April 2021 states the
proposed rating system “does not want to create a new set of guidelines, but rather to recognize
positive behaviours such as compliance with mitigation guidelines and efforts that go even
beyond those recommendations.”444 The Framework notes in this iteration, it does not address
economic aspects of the rating system (among other categories), but that it will be an evolving
system as changes in the space environment occur.445 As an illustration of how the rating system
might function, the Framework provides an example set of statements and scores pertaining to
the aspect of coordination for collision avoidance. An owner/operator would appropriately
respond to the following questionnaire regarding its/their “capabilities to identify, respond to,
and mitigate collisions:”
442
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•

None (0 points) Not able to coordinate;

•

Low (2 points) Able to coordinate in response to emergencies (but not necessarily on a
routine basis);

•

Medium (3 points) Able to coordinate during set hours per day;

•

High (4 points) Has a system for routine conjunction assessment and capability to
respond to concerns 24 hours per day via human or computer system capable of
supporting near-immediate coordination and reaction for urgent issues.446

Additionally, “[t]here will be ‘bonus marks’ for adding optional elements, such as grappling
fixtures, that could be used for the possible future active removal of debris.”447 This rating
would be similar to “energy, efficiency, and nutrition labels now common on household items,
food products, and consumer goods,” and will ideally transparently show how well spacecraft
owner/operators are adhering to STM policies, guidelines, and best practices.448 Overall, the
idea is to spark competition between them “[b]y voluntarily joining the new SSR system,
spacecraft operators, launch service providers and satellite manufacturers will be able to secure
one of four levels of certification that they can advertise widely to demonstrate their mission’s
commitment to sustainability.”449
Most pertinent to this research, in theory, the rating system will
increase transparency – without disclosing any mission-sensitive or proprietary
commercial information – and is expected to incentivise good behaviour by other
stakeholders in addressing the problem of space debris. A favourable score for a
particular rated operator might, for example, result in lower insurance costs or
improved funding conditions from financial backers.450
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“The SSR aims to influence behaviour by all spaceflight actors, especially commercial
entities, and help bring into common usage the sustainable practices that we desperately require,”
said Holger Krag, Head of ESA’s Space Safety Programme.451 Especially with regard to
commercial entities, the rating system could incentivize best STM practices by sparking
competition for high sustainability ratings, especially if the aforementioned “bonus points” are
awarded for implementation of technology such as ADR capability.452
The first sustainability certifications were to have begun to be issued in early 2022 by
EPFL Space Center (eSpace), but at time of writing, information that confirms that to be the case
could not be located.453 The rating system was in development for two years prior to the
announcement in 2021 that it had made it to its next phase. This rating system could be an
excellent method to incentivize best STM practices, and in concert with existing guidelines, may
even be one of the methods of creating a form of governance. However, more information is
needed regarding its current status and rollout, and timing and schedule. If time is still needed
for the rating system’s rollout, there may be opportunity for other methods of encouraging
entities to implement these best practices.
As stated above, while these guidelines and best practices essentially have the same
goals, and several very significant steps have been taken in just the past four years (more so,
perhaps, than had been in the prior decade), STM efforts pursuant to policy have not been
realized as much as we might like. Finding solutions that will meet each goal is difficult and
complex. For example, a State or private organization with greater financial ability and
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resources to address STM issues, even if the entity were not acting dubiously, might be seen as
placing its own interests ahead of focusing on solving the problem for the greater good. Turning
to governance matters, it may be preferable that one entity is responsible for providing standard
policies, guidelines, and best practices in the multiple facets of STM to prevent fragmented and
arguably, in some cases, ineffective and out-of-date guidelines flowed down from governments,
agencies, and organizations. Other than the aforementioned policies and regulations, though,
there is another potential solution for governance, at least in the shorter-term while legislative
and regulatory requirements begin to gel.
Insurance as Governance
As discussed above, incentivization is a key part of this research regarding how P&I
clubs could provide said incentive to commercial spacecraft owner/operators where there may be
gaps in traditional insurance. The fact that an insurance contract could, in part, govern how
space entities operate in tandem with P&I club coverage that would theoretically fill in thirdparty liability gaps arguably provides a comprehensive foundation for best STM practices.”454
Harrington states best STM practices could be used as a way to earn conventional space
insurance premium discounts or other benefits for a high rating in, say, the SSR. 455 Potentially,
these best STM practices could become a requirement as part of an insurance policy which
would be enforced by the policy as a contract.456 The opposite approach could also be used – a
fee could be assessed to a spacecraft owner/operator’s premium if the owner/operator does not
adhere to best STM practices. 457 Both approaches could achieve the same end by using either an
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incentive or disincentive to enforce good behavior in managing space traffic, thus helping ensure
sustainability of our space environment.458
Revisiting Article IX of the OST, Harrington states pursuant to Article IX, States should
“act with ‘due regard’ for the space activities of other States,” including “private enterprises,”
and to avoid harmful interference to those space activities. Further, Harrington states, the “due
regard” in avoiding harmful interference includes that pertaining to outer space as well as Earth.
Thus, Art. IX “further contributes, albeit weakly, to the liability regime by creating a standard of
care owed to other States and a basis for environmental requirements.”459
Pursuant to the CSLA, the U.S. (among many other States) “require[s] private entities to
indemnify [it] and to carry particular levels of third-party liability insurance.” 460 Thus, “there is
an obvious need for the availability of insurance for space activities.” 461 However, Harrington
theorizes “[c]urrent insurance availability is not optimal for the encouragement of this industry,
and must be further developed in light both of the legal regime and the unique risks inherent to
outer space.”462
In terms of risk, Harrington states “risk society can be viewed as an expansion of choice
that comes along with technological advancement… we have sufficient knowledge and
understanding to act with a precautionary attitude,” as discussed in Wetherbee’s comments in the
Overview of Risk section of this paper.463 Thus, Harrington suggests, “[o]ne suggestion is that
the most effective way to deal with growing manufactured risks is through the precautionary
principle.”464 The precautionary principle is “’when an activity raises threats of harm to human
458
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health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect
relationships are not fully established scientifically.’”465 The statement goes on to list four
central components of the principle: taking preventive action in the face of uncertainty; shifting
the burden of proof to the proponents of an activity; exploring a wide range of alternatives to
possibly harmful actions; and increasing public participation in decision making.”466
Expanding upon the precautionary principle, Harrington states “[i]n an era where threats
are beyond appropriate compensation… precaution is achieved through prevention,” and those
preventive measures should be applied “where an activity could cause harm.” 467 Therefore, it
“would remain most viable” (and this author goes a step further and states the industry would
continue to grow more viable) “via constant moving forward of technologies and techniques for
managing risks.”468 Some examples of developing technologies include methods described
above in the Space Sustainability Rating section and described later in the Technical Capability
to Adhere to STM Practices.
These preventive measures, Harrington states, come “with the ability to understand risks
and their probability; it requires a certain confidence in the existing knowledge,” and this author
again refers to existing knowledge within the aforementioned policies, guidelines, and
regulations.469 Harrington theorizes
if the statistical probability of a collision with an individual insured
space object is sufficiently low, it may not be considered
worthwhile from an insurance perspective to implement more
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substantial debris mitigation requirements, even if they would be
beneficial for the sustainability for the space environment.470
For example, as stated in the space sustainability rating framework, “[o]ne can observe how
CubeSat missions have low associated risk, but are penalised by the lack of collision avoidance
capabilities” (see Figure 2 in the Charts and Graphs addendum to this paper).471
It can be surmised that Harrington not only argues insurance can be a form of quasigovernance, but in fact incorporates many of the practices and policies previously discussed in
the Relevant International Treaties and other pertinent guidelines. Outside of sometimes being
legally mandated, “[i]nsurance… is often required as part of a private contract. When standards
of insurance in certain types of contracts deals become near-universal, it is no longer relevant
that the insurance is not legally mandated.”472 Thus, the insurance contract, itself, especially one
that incorporates the above-referenced policies and guidelines, could, itself, serve as governance.
The above international treaties and conventions; U.S. domestic laws, regulations, and
policies; and other initiatives and best practices contain several similar, if not identical,
guidelines and intents. In the U.S., the CSLA sets forth legislation under which a U.S. entity that
seeks a launch/reentry license must obtain insurance or demonstrate financial ability to pay a
potential claim if it inflicts harm on another State’s spacecraft (or crew), and the U.S.
Government will pay that claim over the required amount of insurance but not more than
$1,500,000,000.00. However, as discussed above, the CSLA only applies when a U.S. entity
inflicts damage on another State, and only applies to launch/reentry activity. Thus, there are two
gaps that could need to be filled with liability solutions for the rapidly growing commercial
space industry. Potential space P&I club membership could be one of the solutions to fill these
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gaps. Using The American Club’s covered incidents as an analogue, third-party liability
coverage could be provided to a member and the potential space P&I club could pay the thirdparty claim whether the harmed party were another U.S. entity or a different State.
Further, while the USSP and SPD3 are not binding law, they both set forth STM goals
and guidelines to follow when conducting space activity, such as cooperation between
government, industry, and academia to develop technology to facilitate STM as well as best
STM practices. But similar guidelines have become regulations in the FCC’s satellite licensing
application process which requires entities seeking an FCC license to show how it will work to
mitigate orbital debris. The process sets forth technical specifications commercial entities should
strive to meet. Information on what would happen to an entity’s license if it becomes noncompliant with the FCC’s regulations was not readily available at the time of writing, but should
be studied for future research.
However, if a commercial space entity is striving to meet the licensing requirements (and
other existing laws, policies, and guidelines), and the costs of its spacecraft increase due to
implementation of STM technology, presumably, that spacecraft’s value could increase, which,
in turn, could potentially increase the premium cost of a conventional insurance policy. This
policy may not include third-party liability coverage. As costs to entity increase, third-party
liability coverage from a conventional space insurer may seem too costly. Based on this
example, a potential space P&I club membership could help this entity acquire third-party
liability coverage (plus the additional benefits of a P&I club) at a significantly lower cost for a
call. The potential space P&I club member could receive the benefit of P&I coverage, and the
club could include the member in its self-monitoring. As previously discussed, the club could
facilitate tracking and monitoring as it is in the interests of all members to keep premiums, calls,
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and/or risks low.473 Again, risk-sharing (specifically in P&I club membership) could be
appealing to actors who are developing innovative technology where risks may be best identified
and assessed by the actors themselves.474
As Thornton states, a potential space P&I club membership, in and of itself, is not likely
to drive adherence to laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines. The club membership could be
part of a bigger picture of STM activity that may provide an avenue to help relieve space
entities’ risk and cost burden of either trying to acquire conventional insurance not within its
financial reach or conducting risky behavior and acting in space without coverage. Thus, it can
be argued that yes, a potential space P&I club could provide a benefit to members’ adherence to
existing laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines.
Technological Response to STM Policies and Guidelines
Several companies are already responding to the calls for implementation of STM
capabilities, whether out of necessity or as a best practice. In response to NASA’s concern
regarding Starlink, SpaceX released a statement on its website in February 2022, saying its
satellites “have demonstrated reliability of greater than 99%,” and “use multiple strategies to
prevent debris generation in space,” including “design for demise, controlled deorbit to low
altitudes,” low operating orbit and orbit insertion (below 600 km), “[an] on-board collision
avoidance system,” and reducing the chance of impact with small debris and risk of
explosion.”475 The satellites are also “propulsively deorbited within weeks of their end-ofmission-life.” Many of these strategies align with regulation, policy, and guidelines as discussed
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above. 476 Additionally, SpaceX states it “holds itself to higher standards than even those
proposed by the FCC by de-orbiting its satellites within five to six years, instead of after 25 years
— a process SpaceX called ‘outdated,’” a sentiment also shared by several industry
experts.477,478,479
OneWeb, another space company operating a large constellation (and competitor to
SpaceX), details several of its initiatives for STM and space sustainability. According to its
website,
Responsible space… is the term OneWeb uses to describe practices
that drive sustainability within the space industry, avoiding harming
our lower Earth orbit (LEO) environment while developing this new
frontier in… connectivity, so that it works for, and benefits,
generations to come.480
Facets of OneWeb’s mission statement pertaining to Responsible Space are threefold: 1)
Employing Responsible Design and Operational Practices; 2) Developing the Space Ecosystem;
and 3) Supporting Policy Outcomes through Collaboration. 481
Noteworthy actions coming from OneWeb’s Responsible Space initiative are the fact that
it is working with 18 SPCS and other companies “to advance the state-of-the-art in SSA,”
developing “industry best practices that promote space environmental stewardship and
sustainable space activities,” advocating for “the adoption of sensible, internationally-
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coordinated space environmental policies into national licensing frameworks,” and is a part of
the Space Sustainability Rating system.482
OneWeb’s technological part of the initiative regarding its Responsible Design and
Operational Practices states it selected its “launch and operational orbits… to avoid the most
populated regions of LEO,” its “constellation configuration virtually eliminates the possibility of
intra-constellation collisions,” and it also “goes above and beyond” the FCC licensing
requirement and states it will deorbit its satellites “within five years of decommissioning,”
further reinforcing the belief that the 25-year rule is outdated.483 This said, OneWeb is very
actively working to implement the STM policies, guidelines, and best practices to facilitate longterm space sustainability.
Additionally, OneWeb announced it is “is including a grappling fixture on every one of
its satellites to facilitate capture in the event that retrieval should become necessary.”484 The
DogTag grappling fixture is universal, so it is ideally versatile and could work with many
different types of satellites with varying sizes and masses.485 The company admits cost is a
“formidable challenge” in an ADR endeavor, and it “remains to be seen whether mission
architectures and business models can… support [attractive] price points to commercial
operators, or whether ADR is destined to be a service only governments can afford.”486 OneWeb
states “[t]o be commercially feasible… ADR… has to represent a positive value proposition for
its customers, and it is not yet clear what ADR services will cost, nor even who the principal
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customers will be.”487 Of note, a cost analysis of a simulation of a potential OOS mission is
presented, and while not specifically ADR, the cost came to approximately $395.8 million,
which, in this author’s prior research, was not a commercially viable STM solution at the time,
even for some of the largest commercial communications satellite operators. However, OneWeb
is collaborating with “governments and industry on creative ADR mission concepts with an aim
to minimize the deorbit cost per satellite,” positing one ADR mission may need to retrieve
several satellites for the service to be commercially viable for a client.488 Further, some
“proposals for how ADR services may be packaged” include “pay-per-mission” and missions
involving insurance coverage, though OneWeb does not provide details on what this insurance
coverage would look like.489 A simulated cost of what an OOS mission using a grappling
technique might look like is presented in the Potential Cost section of this paper. OneWeb’s
financial information will also be discussed in the Cost section of this paper.
In addition to OneWeb’s initiatives, there are currently several other technological
practices in place to prevent new pieces of space debris from entering orbit or prolonged
residences of space debris already in orbit. Some of these include the “25-year rule,” the use of
graveyard orbits, and passivation.490 “Graveyard” or “parking” orbits refer to orbits outside the
realm of where functional satellites operate, such as an area above geosynchronous orbit.
Passivation is a spacecraft end-of-life process that includes “depressurizing all storage tanks to
avoid explosion.”491
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ADR has also now been successfully demonstrated on orbit. On January 22, 2022, China
conducted a maneuver wherein one of its satellites grappled another of its satellites on GEO,
acting as a “space tug” and towed it out of its orbital slot.492 The mission was classified, but
ExoAnalytics, a commercial space monitoring company, provided details of the maneuver,
stating Chinese satellite SJ21 “went absent from its orbital slot for several hours” after
performing “close proximity operations with the defunct CompassG2 satellite,” including
docking and pulling CompassG2 out of GEO.493
As previously discussed, the size of orbital debris can be broken down into three
categories: small, medium, and large. Large objects may be catalogued and tracked, namely by
USSTRATCOM, and placed in its catalog of known orbital objects.494 It is possible for very
small objects to be shielded against, but small- and medium-sized debris presents a serious
problem because it cannot be tracked nor can spacecraft be shielded from it.495 Because this size
of debris cannot be tracked, “operators cannot perform collision avoidance maneuvers like they
can when two large objects are predicted to collide.”496 It is possible for this debris to be lethal
to a mission, but even if the spacecraft (or crew) is not lost, functionality may be severely
hindered. For example, communications or navigational capabilities may be disrupted.497
Additionally, while USSTRATCOM is not the only provider of data regarding the status
of orbital debris, it arguably has the most comprehensive database; under 10 US Code § 2274, 18
the DOD is allowed to perform functions such as sending potential conjunction notifications to
commercial satellite owner/operators, but as the possibility of collisions increases due to the
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aforementioned increase in space activity, it is becoming increasingly overburdened, which is
inhibiting its ability to perform its traditional national defense responsibilities.498,499
A major problem in space object tracking and monitoring is the fact that data are not
shared communally and/or globally.500 As discussed, national security, intellectual property, and
international regulations are inherently classified and/or confidential and should not be shared,
but the more actors conducting tracking and monitoring activity, the more we can manage space
traffic and identify and assess risk of a potential problem, such as a collision.”501
Samoa, close to where Tiangong-1 entered Earth’s atmosphere, is approximately 3369
km from the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, where Lockheed Martin constructed its
Space Fence, which became operational in March 2020.502 Space Fence is a ground-based space
surveillance phased array radar system, and “is a key contributor to USSF’s Space Domain
Awareness… which provides information that Space Force needs to make informed decisions
and take actions to protect key assets in orbit.”503 The technology improves space traffic
monitoring, tracking, conjunction assessment, and collision avoidance.
A critical point highlighted by Jah and Hunter is the fact that USSTRATCOM/JspOC
(now 18 SPCS) had already been overburdened by maintaining its database of “resident space
objects” (RSOs). Hunter explained at the time, when Space Fence became operational, the
number of catalogued items would increase “from the tens-of-thousands to the hundreds-ofthousands range and current processing systems and manpower would be quickly overcome by

498

Hunter, 9.
Statement, 3.
500
Statement, 7.
501
Caleb Henry, “Space situational awareness experts urge Russia to join orbital neighborhood watch,”
SpaceNews, March 16, 2018, http://spacenews.com/space-situational-awareness-experts-urge-russia-to-join-orbitalneighborhood-watch/.
502
“Space Fence” [hereinafter Space Fence] Lockheed Martin, accessed March 13, 2022,
https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/space-fence.html.
503
Space Fence.
499

123
the magnitude of data available to be analyzed.”504 More recently, it is reported that Space Fence
will be “able to detect targets as small as about four inches in diameter (as opposed to the old 30inch limit) and will expand the catalog of space debris tracked by the Space Command from
about 23,000 objects to 200,000.”505 Currently, Lockheed Martin simply states “the catalog size
is expected to increase significantly over time.”506
Along with Steve Wozniak and Alex Fielding, Jah is one of the founders of Privateer
Space, a company that monitors space traffic and orbital debris. Privateer’s mission is to create a
“data infrastructure that will enable sustainable growth for the new space economy,” and
enhance how space object data are collected and processed using its “proprietary graph
technology.”507 The company has developed one of its first apps, Wayfinder, and has made it
publicly available on its website. Wayfinder is “an open-access and near real-time visualization
of satellites and debris in Earth orbit.”508 Privateer states it will enable “nations, policymakers,
and private ventures to share space responsibly, for the benefit of humankind,” through its “open
and transparent platform.”509
Another example of a spacecraft tracking company is LeoLabs, founded in 2016, which
offers tracking and monitoring, collision avoidance, launch and early orbit, and space domain
awareness data services for $2,500 per month for a 12-month subscription and $4,000 per month
for a month-to-month subscription (with a required three-month minimum).510 LeoLabs states it
can track a CubeSat “as small as 0.25u,” or 10 x 10 x 2.5 cm.511 Notably, there is currently a
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constellation of satellites this size on-orbit – Swarm’s SpaceBees are 0.25u, so the existing
capability to track space objects this small is important. LeoLabs provides conjunction
notifications “once per radar pass or multiple times per day,” and for well-tracked objects, it
“currently generates 20-60 [conjunction data messages] per conjunction event over an eight-day
screening period,” which will increase in frequency as the company adds more radars to its
global network.512
Other capability to help address STM matters could be technology implemented into the
spacecraft, itself. For example, a drag sail is a passive deorbiting device that is “compact,
lightweight, and scalable,” and “does not require any propellants or pressurants.”513 In 2016, the
Space Flight Laboratory at the University of Toronto Institute for Aerospace Studies successfully
conducted a technology demonstration of a drag sail device on the CanX-7 mission.514 The drag
sail was installed on the CanX-7 satellite and was observed to increase the decay rate of the
spacecraft “from 0.5 km/year to 20 km/year.”515
Another type of capability on-board a satellite is propulsion. A propulsion device could
be installed on a satellite to adjust its attitude to help it deorbit faster and/or break up in Earth’s
atmosphere quicker, or theoretically move it to a graveyard orbit. However, it should be noted
that most small spacecraft (i.e., CubeSats and SmallSats) do not carry on-board propulsion,
making them unable to achieve graveyard orbits for decommissioning.”516 Propulsive devices’
use “is still considered risky due to potential failure or malfunction of either the spacecraft… or
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the propulsive capability itself.” 517 Additionally, the spacecraft would still need “adequate
attitude control capability… [which] requires continuous operation until the reentry takes place,
making it inconvenient and costly for a small spacecraft mission.” 518 The fact remains, though,
that some industry experts state something like a propulsion device is strongly advised to be
included as part of a spacecraft to perform in this way to adhere to STM/orbital debris mitigation
regulations and policies.519
Other technological capabilities include OOS refueling and/or repairing missions, such as
SpaceLogistics’ MEV, MRV, and MEPs. The Mission Extension Vehicles, or MEV-1 and
MEV-2, are active missions performing OOS to satellites running low on fuel in GEO, “taking
over [their] attitude and orbit maintenance.”520 The MEVs are equipped with docking stations
that are “compatible with nearly 80% of all GEO satellites on orbit today,” and are intended to
service multiple clients over their lifespans.521 The Mission Robotic Vehicle, or MRV, will
launch in 2024 and is intended to install Mission Extension Pods, or MEPs, but will provide
expanded OOS based on its predecessors, the MEVs.522 The MEPs are sold as products to
spacecraft clients as life-extension devices for satellites that are running low on fuel, similar to
clients of the MEVs.523
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Would P&I Club Benefits Outweigh Cost of Membership?
Such technological endeavors could require a great number of resources and might be
extremely costly. How, then, can we facilitate development of innovative technology meant to
address STM matters while preventing accidents or, worse, malfeasance? In this section, the
question of whether potential space P&I club membership benefits outweigh the costs will be
addressed.
Domestic legislation may be put in place to hold “bad actors” accountable for endeavors
that “harmfully interfere” with other States’ use of the space environment. In the comments
provided for the FCC’s satellite licensing amendment, NYU suggested “the use of a regulatory
fee to deter and mitigate orbital debris,” but a fee would require the determination of revenue
required “achieve some orbital debris target, e.g., the projected cost for removal, mitigation or
better design to minimize debris; and then deciding how to allocate fees across these differing
objectives.” 524 Further compounding the issue are the facts that “satellite operators are not
homogenous and include large global satellite operators as well as smaller regional operators that
supply services to distinct geographic regions,” which subsequently “affects differently scale[d]
economies and… intensity of competition.” 525 Essentially, the factors in determining such a fee
are too varied. The FCC is also limited under its authority to impose new regulatory fees.526
Thus, it declined to adopt a fee-based deterrent to prevent orbital debris.
Adherence to licensing regulations is, of course, a requirement in the US. But space
activity is costly, and strategies such as OOS and other STM technology implementations are
particularly resource intensive. How can small businesses, startups, and educational
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organizations continue to have access to space if this level of cost presents a seemingly
insurmountable barrier?
In a 2006 article, Kalina K. Galabova and Olivier L. de Weck found that an OOS solution
for moving a GEO satellite into a graveyard orbit when it has reached EOL would “make
economic sense only for the 10-20 highest-value GEO communications satellites, where six
months or more of useful life is wasted because of uncertainty in fuel gauging.”527 While
Galabova and Weck’s paper focused on towing a GEO satellite into a graveyard orbit, cost of
OOS in LEO may be a greater barrier to implementation due to the vast number of small
satellites used for academic purposes, small business ventures, etc., that would likely not be able
to afford the high cost of servicing.
According to Chris Kunstadter, VP Space at AXA XL, a US satellite owner/operator
simply must adhere to licensing regulations, or they will not be able to conduct activity in outer
space.528 As of December 2021, the cost of an FCC license alone to “Construct, Deploy, and
Operate” a small satellite is $2,175.529 To “Construct, Deploy, and Operate” a system of
technically identical satellites costs $15,050.530
Further, Kunstadter states the US, China, and Russia are the biggest culprits when it
comes to objects on orbit, so it can be surmised that the US FCC satellite licensing regulatory
requirements would make a significant impact on STM. The potential (positive) impact of these
FCC regulations is recognized but quantifying the impact will not be explored within the scope
of this paper.
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Kunstadter also notes the fact that the barriers to entry for space participants really are
not that high. However, reiterating his previous point that an entity must adhere to regulations as
a cost of doing business, they must still implement space traffic management practices as set
forth in the FCC licensing requirements, which could still potentially be costly and resourceintensive. Three examples of commercial space entities: OneWeb, EnduroSat, and Swarm
Technologies are examined, including type of function, estimated cost of spacecraft, and other
pertinent financial information. A model OOS mission is also examined as an example of
innovative technology to help manage space traffic.
OneWeb, a “global communications network powered by a constellation of 648 low
Earth orbit (LEO) satellites” headquartered in London, provides “high-speed, low latency
connectivity for governments, businesses, and communities everywhere around the world.”531 In
March 2020, OneWeb filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, but it emerged as a joint venture with
Airbus Defence and Space, backed by a consortium including the UK Government and Bharti
Enterprises, a conglomerate from India, infused with $1 billion.532,533 Here, OneWeb could serve
as an analogue to estimate the potential cost of operating a communications satellite
constellation. It is important to do so because one can examine the potential effects of law,
regulations, policies, and guidelines on how a business operates.
According to OneWeb’s FY2020 Statement (March 2021), it purchased satellites from
AOS within its FY2020 (March 25, 2020 – March 31, 2021) for $82.8 million.534 OneWeb’s
satellite constellation consists of “mini-fridge-sized satellites each weighing roughly 150
531
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kilograms.”535 As~ of February 2022, OneWeb has 428 satellites on orbit, two-thirds of its
complete constellation.536 The consortium purchase of OneWeb closed in the fourth quarter of
2020, and it had 74 satellites on orbit at the time of closure. 537 There were 72 satellites
successfully launched after the transaction, which brings the total number of OneWeb satellites
launched to 146. Specific details of the purchase or cost of the satellites are not publicly
available, but an estimate is made based on the cost of $82.8 million for 146 satellites under
OneWeb’s ownership within its FY2020 which would average approximately $561,644.00 per
150-kilogram satellite.
EnduroSat, a European company founded in 2015 commercially offers a CubeSat
intended for “lighter” applications.538 According to its website, its goal is to “provide easy
access to space for visionary entrepreneurs, scientists and technologists, helping them drive
innovation at the final frontier” with NanoSats enabling “plug & play payload integration and
open unique capability to… improve your technology in space.”539 As of second quarter 2016,
EnduroSat had 50 customers.540
EnduroSat offers several customizable options for CubeSats, computer, and
communications capabilities, but for the purposes of this paper, the focus is set on its 1U
CubeSat platform. The price for the entire platform with room for up to 0.5u of payload volume,
and is aimed for those who want to use it for “science and research, education, and technology
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demonstration.”541 There are two options for pricing: an option with “no modifications” for
$37,200 and an option with “attitude determination and control subsystem (ADCS)” for
$55,200.542
EnduroSat states the mission life of this particular CubeSat platform is ”2+ years (orbit
dependant),” there is “zero volume loss through panel mounted sensors and magnetorquers,” and
is “available with detumbling and pointing controller.”543 The website did not go into detail on
what “no modifications” means, but it could be implied that an “attitude determination and
control subsystem” indicates some sort of attitude adjustment capability. To deorbit itself
pursuant to regulations and/or policies, a satellite may need to “rely on… techniques such as
increasing the drag area by rotating the spacecraft with their Attitude Determination and Control
System (ADCS) module if they are in low altitudes.”544
But even so, “[f]or some spacecraft, their exposed drag area is not enough to meet the 25year requirement,” and still may need to “use deorbit devices such as drag sails (passive systems)
or even hire external deorbit services (active systems) to deorbit.”545 The question arises as to
the difference between “no modifications” and if this implies there is no control on this particular
CubeSat, but that warrants further examination. Even if an owner/operator chose to purchase a
CubeSat that had attitude adjustment capability, it still may not function in a way that would
allow it to deorbit pursuant to regulations and/or policies.
As further background, EnduroSat also offers satellite shared services to deliver small
payloads to space and lists fees of 100 thousand Euros for a “one-off fee” that includes
541
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“operations design, payload integration, functional testing and verification, launch acceptance
campaign, registration and documentation, [and] launch and early mission operations.”546
Additionally, it offers a yearly in-orbit service for 50 thousand Euros that includes “flexible
monthly data downlink, flexible on-demand data processing, dedicated high-accuracy pointing
sessions, [and] in-orbit software and operations updates.”547
A third example of a small satellite business is Swarm Technologies, founded in 2016,
and located in Palo Alto, California. Swarm is known for its picosat, SpaceBee, and focuses on a
“low-bandwidth service offering that is ideal for IoT applications.”548 For reference, a
picosatellite is a satellite that has a mass of between 0.1 and 1kg.549 Swarm offers a
communications service for an annual subscription price of $60 per year, and is intended to be
used for applications such as “soil monitors in the middle of corn fields, or buoys in the middle
of the ocean,” as the SpaceBees’ signals “don’t need low latency or high bandwidth… so the
requirements for a satellite that serves them are much lower than for consumer broadband.”550,551
Now, unfortunately, Swarm is perhaps notoriously known for being assessed a $900,000
fine from the FCC for launching four of its satellites without permission.552 In January 2018, the
FCC dismissed Swarm’s experimental satellite licensing application due to concerns over the
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SpaceBees’ size and the fact that they may be “too small to be reliably tracked once in orbit,”
and “might be a danger to other satellites.”553,554 Swarm’s SpaceBees are 1/4u, and are 11 x 11 x
2.8cm in size.555
It is important to note Swarm settled matters with the FCC and was granted a license,
with conditions, for a Non-Voice, Non-Geostationary Lower Earth Orbit Satellite System in the
Mobile-Satellite Services (NVNG MSS) system on October 17, 2019.556 The condition was that
Swarm “is subject to modification to bring it into conformance with any rules or policies adopted
by the Commission in this rulemaking” (meaning the Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New
Space Age amendment to the FCC satellite licensing application requirements).557 Additionally,
SpaceX had filed a comment “suggesting that Swarm had not adequately considered its orbital
debris footprint, neglecting in particular to include its satellites’ antennas in various
calculations,” and “the satellites might be a risk to the International Space Station.” 558 However,
the FCC found Swarm’s response to these comments satisfactory and “that Swarm has taken the
appropriate steps to address SpaceX’s concerns.”559
Of note, Thornton ponders whether $900 thousand is enough in being fined for a
violation of FCC regulations. With regard to liability, another domestic company would have an
action against Swarm if a SpaceBee did, in fact, inflict damage on its property.560 If the harmed
spacecraft was large and performed a critical function, the nature of the accident could be
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paralleled to an old Chevrolet Beretta running into a Lamborghini. Per Thornton, it would be a
matter of asymmetry.561
In addition to debris removal, on-orbit servicing (OOS) has been discussed as a possible
way to either bring defunct satellites back to life, or “shepherd” a non-operating satellite to a
“graveyard” orbit. An OOS mission may entail a number of various types of servicing:
inspection/scouting, repair, and refueling.562,563 A NASA study explains that such potential
prevention of debris would help prevent collisions between craft and, specific to GEO, would
clear failed satellites enabling reuse of their orbital slots.564 OOS studies and technological
demonstrations, specifically pertaining to GEO, have been performed, and it has since been
being worked as a potential STM solution.
OOS has been tested on various platforms such as the Hubble Space Telescope (HST),
the International Space Station (ISS), and experimental missions such as NASA’s Robotic
Refueling Mission (RRM), Argon, RAVEN, and Restore-L. 565,566,567 Subsequently, different
versions of HST repair tools were created for robotic use in LEO and GEO (GEO being an orbit
where it is not feasible for humans to perform repair missions).568 Further, the possibility of
OOS by commercial providers is beginning to pick up speed. In 2018, Orbital ATK (now
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Northrop Grumman) partnered with Intelsat to launch its commercial OOS Mission Extension
Vehicle-1 (MEV-1), and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) partnered
with Space Systems Loral (SSL) (now SSL, a part of Maxar Technologies) to develop its
Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous Satellites (RSGS) program. 569,570 In February 2020,
Northrop Grumman’s MEV-1 successfully docked with Intelsat 901, and most recently, MEV-2
successfully docked with a second Intelsat satellite, IS-10-02, in April 2021.571
In 2017, then Orbital ATK sued DARPA over the SSL partnership and RSGS, stating the
mission violates National Space Policy by putting forth government efforts toward working on a
mission when a similar mission is being developed by a commercial company and SSL
subsequently sued Orbital ATK over a data breach, stating an Orbital ATK employee “accessed
documents related to a project called Dragonfly on a server at the NASA Langley Research
Center in Virginia.”572,573 The legal action taken by both companies may indicate a possibility
that competition in the nascent OOS industry could be strong.
Whereas NASA’s reasoning behind the need for OOS may be extending the lives of
expensive “one-off” scientific missions why would commercial companies such as Northrop
Grumman and SSL consider OOS? 574 What would they have to gain? One possibility is the fact
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that aging commercial satellite fleets are becoming defunct would leave commercial operators to
build replacements. According to Hastings, Putbrese, and La Tour, “trends in geosynchronous
spacecraft manufacturing have been towards larger, more expensive, longer-lasting
spacecraft.”575 However, some of this may be offset by decreasing costs of launch services as
companies like SpaceX progress in the development of reusable components of launch
vehicles.576 Commercial operators, then, may explore OOS as a potentially more cost-effective
way to maximize revenue and extend the lives of their fleets.
According to an informational presentation on NASA’s Restore-L mission, the
components of a potential OOS satellite may be broken down into two parts: the servicing
payload and the spacecraft bus.577 NASA’s RRM and Restore-L webpages discuss servicing
payload components and a toolkit that would be used on the mission that could perform a
number of functions, such as cutting wires, unscrewing caps, opening and closing valves,
transferring fluid, practicing steps leading up to a coolant (or propellant) replenishment, and
providing inspection capabilities.578,579 Indicated by the contract between DARPA and SSL and
other literature, another major component of an OOS mission is a set of robotic arms used to
grapple a target satellite.580 The fourth major component of an OOS mission is the cost of
launch.
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In December 2016, NASA announced that it had awarded a contract to SSL for the
development of a “spacecraft bus, critical hardware and services for the development,
deployment and operations of the Restore-L mission.”581 The total maximum contract value is
$127 million, which is the figure used as an example as the cost of a spacecraft bus in a typical
OOS mission. Accounting for inflation at the time of this writing, the figure is adjusted to $152
million in CY2022.
In July 2016, SSL announced it had been awarded a contract by DARPA to develop
robotic arms for the RSGS mission.582 The contract is valued at $20.7 million, and is the figure
used as an example for the cost of robotic arms in the OOS mission cost simulation. Accounting
for inflation, the figure is adjusted to $24.8 million in CY2022.
The servicing payload, or toolkit, contains not only mission servicing tools such as wire
cutters and a multifunction tool, but a navigation system, avionics, and a propellant transfer
system.583 Information regarding the cost of this toolkit is not readily available, but it can be
assumed that it would cost at least as much as the spacecraft bus. Thus, a figure of $127 million
is used as the baseline and estimate for a minimum cost of the toolkit. Accounting for inflation
at the time of this writing, the figure is adjusted to $152 million in CY2022. Because this study’s
focus is the cost of the satellite and its tools alone, launch cost will not be figured into the
equation, as it is beyond the scope of this paper. However, further analysis including launch cost
is recommended.

581

Gina Anderson and Cynthia M. O’Carroll, “NASA Awards Contract for Refueling Mission Spacecraft,”
NASA, December 5, 2016, https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-awards-contract-for-refueling-missionspacecraft.
582
. “SSL to provide robotic arms to DARPA for satellite servicing,” SSLMDA, July 21, 2016,
https://sslmda.com/html/pressreleases/pr20160721.html.
583
Ticker, “Restore-L mission information,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

137
The total of the four elements: the spacecraft bus, robotic arms, and toolkit, is estimated
at $328.8 million in CY2022. It is reiterated that the estimate for the toolkit is assumed to be the
minimum, so it is likely an actual OOS satellite would cost more. However, for the purpose of
this paper, the figure of $328.8 million will be used.
Specific details of space and maritime insurance policy premium costs are not available
as they are proprietary, but a rough estimate to provide a framework of an economic case for
why a spacecraft owner/operator would obtain P&I coverage is attempted herein. In its FY2020,
the “[t]onnage in the Club’s mutual P&I class declined by about 9% to approximately 17 million
[gross tonnage (gt)] overall.584 The Net premiums and calls earned by The American Club was
$90,628,000. Based purely on the approximate premiums and calls earned and amount of
tonnage covered by The American Club, the price of a membership call averages to
approximately $5.33/gt.585 According to the Florida Department of Management Services, hull
rates for maritime insurance policies can range from “$1.15 to $4.00 per $100 of the insured
value depending on vessel’s value, age and use.”586 As a secondary reference, financial
management company states “[o]n average, boat insurance costs… around 1–5% of your boat’s
value if you have a big, powerful or expensive boat,” though this is more in reference to personal
craft than commercial working vessels.587 An advertisement for a 95-foot bow tug with a
volume of 244 gross tonnage for sale for $1,150,000.00 was located.588 Assuming a
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$1,150,000.00 tug boat was fully insured, if we use the median value of $2.58 per $100 of the
insured value, we arrive at an annual premium of $29,670.00. If we use the median value of
2.5% of the boat’s value as cost of premium, we arrive at an annual premium of $28,750.00.
These values are deemed sound for this author to use 2.5% of a craft’s value through $2.58 per
$100 of a craft’s insured value as an estimated range of the cost of an annual premium.
Combined with the above approximate value of a large OOS mission at $328.8 million,
an estimate of that particular craft’s annual space insurance policy premium could amount to be
$8.22 – $8.48 million. As discussed earlier, Harrington states launch insurance could fall
between 5 to 20 percent of a satellite’s value, and the market is “expected to settle in this phase
at around 10 percent.”589 Again, third party liability insurance is likely to be much higher. Even
if using the low end of the spectrum (5%) and estimating a policy premium at $16.4 million, we
arrive at a value roughly twice as high as if the figures based on a maritime analogue were used.
For a smaller spacecraft such as one of OneWeb’s satellites, using the estimated value of
$561,644.00 per satellite, the maritime insurance analogue would result in an estimated annual
space insurance policy premium of approximately $14,041.00 – $14,490.00 per year, multiplied
by 146 satellites would total approximately $2.05 million – $2.12 million in space insurance
premiums alone. Using a 5% figure, an annual policy for OneWeb’s 146 satellites would be
approximately $4.1 million. For a much smaller single craft, such as an EnduroSat 1U CubeSat
valued at $55,200.00, the maritime insurance analogue would result in an annual space insurance
policy premium of approximately $1,380.00 – $1,424.00. The 5% figure would amount to
approximately $2,760.00 annually.
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“’Space premiums are 10-20 times aviation premiums,’ said Peter Elson, CEO of
insurance broker Gallagher Aerospace.”590 “Insurance for a small aircraft will cost around
$1,500 to $2,000 per year, but the amount of coverage and cost will vary significantly by the
type of policy, aircraft, flight, and pilot.”591 With the caveat that insurance rates vary greatly, a
figure of $2,000.00 per year for a small aircraft and the multiplier of 10 to approximate an
estimated space insurance policy premium of $20,000.00 per year is used.
Thus, based on a maritime analogue and approximations from other experts, space
insurance rates could vary widely based on many factors. However, even at the lowest end of
what is examined here – a potential $1,380.00 policy for a 1U CubeSat – the type of coverage
provided by that insurance policy could vary as widely as the rates. Again, third-party liability
insurance is likely to be much higher, and it is unknown whether a small spacecraft
owner/operator would carry insurance at all, especially due to the fact that (at least, of course, in
the U.S.) insurance is not required. Though industry experts state the potential for one specific
spacecraft colliding with one other specific spacecraft is low,, a risk still exists for a $55,200.00
satellite to collide with a $328.8 million satellite and cause damage, and, if the small satellite is
owned by a small business, could result in a claim that may end in financial ruin for that small
business. Additionally, depending on the purpose and function of the $55,200.00 CubeSat, a
$1,380.00 annual policy might be a high cost to a business that made a high front-end investment
on a CubeSat with little revenue.
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A P&I club’s coverage for pollution is stated to be unlimited (except, again, in the case of
oil, where liability is limited to $1 billion or other agreement limitations and/or exclusions
apply).592 According to Stevan M. Spremo, Alan R. Crocker, and Dr. Tina L. Panontin, a small
spacecraft ranges from 0.01 kg to 1,000 kg, so for the purposes of this exercise this author will
use an example of a “mini spacecraft” which is 100 kg.593 In a very rough comparison, a tug
boat in specifications was located, the displacement of which is 545 tons.594 Displacement is the
measure of a “vessel and its contents” “in tons of 2,240 pounds,” so a 545-ton displacement
equals 1,220,800 lbs or approximately 553,746 kg.595 Looking at the fact that this 244-gt,
553,746-kg tug boat’s approximate P&I club call would be $1,300.52 per year, the amount per
kg for the call would be approximately $0.002. If we were to convert these figures and use them
to calculate a potential P&I club call of a 100-kg spacecraft, that spacecraft’s potential space P&I
club call would be approximately $0.23 per year, which is which is almost comically low and
does not soundly support the argument that a direct comparison between maritime P&I club calls
and potential space P&I club calls exists .
We could also examine the potential cost of a space P&I club call using a different
formula and a smaller spacecraft, for example, a 12u CubeSat with a mass of 6-8kg and an
available payload volume of 197 x 197 x 225 mm3, or 8,732,025 mm3, which is approximately
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0.308 ft3.596,597 According to the Delaware Business Incorporators’ Vessel Gross Tonnage
Calculator, “[f]or a boat with a simple sailing hull,” the “Gross Tonnage = (.5 x L x B x D)
divided by 100,” where L = length in feet, B = breadth in feet, and D = depth in feet.598 Using a
metric conversion calculator, 8,732,025 mm3 is approximately 0.308 ft3.599 Using the formula in
the Vessel Gross Tonnage Calculator, 0.5 x 0.308 / 100, we arrive at 0.00154 gt. Using the figure
of $5.33/gt, a potential P&I call for a 12u CubeSat with a 197 x 197 x 225 mm3 would be $0.008
per year, which is also almost comically low and does not soundly support the argument that a
direct comparison between maritime P&I club calls and potential space P&I club calls exists.
As stated, specific financial details of a maritime P&I club membership are not publicly
available, nor are details regarding conventional space insurance policy. But the amount of a call
can be adjusted using a different calculation – perhaps accounting for different components of a
spacecraft, its purpose, its orbit, and the addition of a sliding scale – the resulting price could still
be relatively and significantly low, and the economic case for P&I club membership could be
beneficial, especially for small entities with large front-end investment and little to no revenue.
As stated earlier, the space environment and maritime environment do not perfectly align as an
analogue, but we can still identify and use similar concepts to help us develop solutions for
managing space activity.600 As one industry expert drew a similarity between group captives and
P&I clubs, and stated that perhaps group captives could be purchased at a fraction of the cost of a
conventional insurance policy, it is possible a potential space P&I club membership could also
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be a relatively low cost when compared to a conventional space insurance policy. However, it is
important to reiterate specific financial details of P&I clubs and conventional insurance policies
need to be researched further. Thus, whether the benefits of a potential space P&I club
membership outweigh its cost cannot be fully concluded in this study.
Conclusion
This study has attempted to answer whether liability apportionment and risk-pooling
through a potential space P&I club membership would benefit U.S. spacecraft owner/operators
enough for them to implement best STM practices set forth in existing regulations, policies, and
guidelines, namely SPD3 and FCC satellite licensing regulations. Because a thorough cost
analysis could not be conducted with the information available, the answer is P&I club
membership could provide enough of a benefit for a U.S. spacecraft owner/operator to
implement best STM practices to adhere to existing laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines,
but under certain conditions.
As previously discussed, potential space P&I club membership would be best used as a
solution to fill gaps in the bigger picture of STM, and could not, itself, act as a driver for an actor
to implement best practices. When combined with initiatives such as the SSR, however, an
entity may be encouraged to conduct better behavior in space because it could make itself more
competitive with “high marks” as well as perhaps sharing some of the risk it might take on when
it implements innovative technology for STM purposes. This aligns not only with regulatory
requirements, but policies, guidelines, and best practices, as discussed above. A P&I club could
alleviate some of a spacecraft owner/operator’s burden of bearing a full conventional insurance
policy and would help manage and mitigate risk as Wetherbee states is crucial for an
organization to survive.
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Again, to answer the question fully, more financial details must be examined to
determine whether the benefits of a potential space P&I club membership outweigh the costs.
But based on the facts that third-party liability insurance from a conventional insurer is likely to
be expensive and complicated (as Harrington states, unless there is some standardization in
conventional space insurance or is made more widely available and accessible, it may not be a
help to everyone), and group captive coverage (as an analogue for P&I club coverage) could be
acquired at a significantly lower cost, it can be argued that the benefits of potential space P&I
club membership could outweigh the cost. Also, as discussed, P&I clubs provide more than just
liability coverage – they provide expertise to help prevent potential accidents and even legal
assistance in the event an accident does occur. There is much more benefit than third-party
liability coverage. Regarding a potential space P&I club’s place within policy, an opinion could
be provided to the FCC in its comment-seeking action about a potential future economic
incentive-based amendment to its satellite licensing rule. But specifically calling out a P&I club
in regulations, policies, or guidelines may not be necessary. As in the case of maritime P&I
clubs providing certificates to prove financial responsibility, a P&I club might act in the same
way in the space industry, potentially serving to provide similar certificates to satisfy a
regulation pertaining to solvency.
Other “carrot and stick” methods for encouraging actors to conduct good space behavior
(or deterring bad space behavior) have been suggested. In the FCC’s comment period related to
its satellite licensing rule, we saw that “NYU suggest[ed] the use of a regulatory fee to deter and
mitigate orbital debris,” but the implementation of such a fee would be difficult for many

144
reasons, including determining how to assess the fee and FCC’s limits on its ability to impose the
fee.601
Overall, potential space P&I club membership could, indeed, lead to better behavior in
space to gradually clean up orbital debris and manage space traffic in a cleaner manner. Again,
it would be best used as part of the bigger STM picture alongside existing regulations and
policies. Still, a P&I club membership could provide a significant enough benefit where actors
could be more likely to adhere to regulations and policies, which would, in turn, have a positive
impact on keeping the space environment sustainable for current and future activities.
Recommendations
There are some lingering questions that warrant further research. Most importantly, a
further study of financial details of the costs of P&I club calls is necessary to determine whether
potential space P&I club membership does, indeed, outweigh the cost. Without this information,
an answer to this research question cannot be fully concluded.
Another subject for further study is how P&I clubs specifically address the broad
spectrum of types of craft in its member base and how it accounts for small calls from small craft
compared to extremely large cargo ships. One of the downsides of a P&I club, as discussed, is
the fact that a lack of homogeneity in membership could actually be a deterrent to joining and/or
maintaining a membership because a small craft that pays a small call would receive the benefit
of unlimited coverage in some types of accidents, or only high-risk members would choose to
stay as they are receiving the claims payments and continue increasing calls for the other
members. Additionally, one example U.S.-based space P&I club was examined and there must
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be further research into how one State’s P&I club would function in an international group. This
study starts with one example and advises further study to dovetail.
Additionally, limitations can always be placed in contracts or insurance policies which
would govern (as Harrington states) behavior under the performance of that contract or policy.
But looking at maritime P&I clubs in concert with all the factors discussed above, P&I club
membership could, in fact, incentivize spacecraft owner/operators to adhere to best STM
practices, and can help facilitate progress of space technology development and innovation.
Though some experts have stated an actual risk of one particular entity’s spacecraft
bumping into another spacecraft is low, the risk still exists, and the impact would be very
serious, if not catastrophic. As discussed above, a P&I club membership can fill in some of the
gaps left by conventional insurance but can work as part of the bigger picture of STM – as in,
membership can ease some spacecraft owner/operators’ burden in taking risks to develop new
technology that could help manage space traffic in such a way where our space environment and
infrastructure remains sustainable, continuing its use and development now and for generations
to come.
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Charts and Graphs
A simple list of the organizational control methods includes, but is not limited to, the following items:
•
•
•

•

Organizational Management of Risk
Safety Management System (rules, policies, and procedures for the entire organization)
Local Safety Management System and Organizational Practices (for different local areas or entities in the
organization)
Managing Risk (Process Safety)
1. Identify the Risks (and Hazards)
2. Assess the Risks
3. Respond to the Risks (Implement Controls)
4. Monitor and Review the Risks (and Controls)
Process Safety Methods
o Control of Work (Permitting Process, Job Safety Analyses, etc.)
o Hazard Identification and Evaluation
o Risk Assessment
1. Heirarchy of Controls (Hazard and Error Defenses)
A. System Design (Hard Defenses)
1. Design Out (some organizations use Elimination or Redesign)
2. Engineer In (some organizaitons use Substitution or Redesign)
3. Guard Against (some organizations use Isolation)
4. Contraints and Affordances (Human Factors design characteristics)
B. Administrative Rules and Procedures (Soft Defenses)
5. Warnings
6. Training
7. Personal Protective Equipment602

Technology Readiness Level (TRL)603
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Space Sustainability Rating Framework Figure 2: “Rating assessment (and module contribution) for a set of representative missions. EO
indicates an Earth Observation mission in a Sun-syncrhonous orbit, LCH indicates a Large Constellation in LEO at High altitude, LCL one at
Low altitude.604

A chart showing the peaks in conjunctions with active satellites in LEO caused by Russian ASAT debris. Credit: COMSPOC605
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Jeff Foust, “Russian ASAT debris creating “squalls” of close approaches with satellites,” SpaceNews,
February 18, 2022, https://spacenews.com/russian-asat-debris-creating-squalls-of-close-approaches-with-satellites/.
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One of Swarm Technologies' "SpaceBee" picosatellites. The company wants to operate a
constellation of 100 tiny satellites for Internet of Things services. Credit: Swarm Technologies606
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Appendix A
List of Abbreviations
18 SCPS:

18th Space Control Squadron

ADR:

Active Debris Removal

ASAT:

Anti-Satellite

CLC:

International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969

COPUOUS:

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

CSLA:

Commercial Space Launch Act

CSpOC:

Combined Space Operations Center

DOD:

United States Department of Defense

FCC:

Federal Communications Commission

GEO:

Geosynchronous Orbit

IADC:

Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee

INMARSAT:

International Maritime Satellite Organization

INTELSAT:

International Telecommunications Satellite Organization

ITAR:

International Traffic in Arms Regulation

JSpOC:

Joint Space Operations Center

LEO:

Low Earth Orbit

MARPOL:

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships

ODMSP:

United States Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices

OOS:

On-Orbit Servicing

OST:

Outer Space Treaty

P&I:

Protection and Indemnity

RSO:

Resident Space Object

SPD3:

Space Policy Directive 3

SSA:

Space Situational Awareness
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SSR:

Space Sustainability Rating

STM:

Space Traffic Management

USSP:

United States Space Policy

USSTRATCOM:

United States Strategic Command

